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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work consists of two parts; the first part is a game theoretical approach
to political economy. We ask the questions of how the electoral system
aﬀects the outcome of an election, how many parties are formed and which
political agendas are supported. We model this setting in an alternative way
and then discuss which equilibrium notion would be the most appropriate
to use in this model.
The second part contributes to behavioral economics. This part consists
of two experiments in labor theory. We investigate the advantages of the
use of referrals in the workplace. An obvious advantage is inducing worker
discipline and overcoming moral hazard. Workers expend much more eﬀort
when they are hired through a referrer rather than via randommatching in a
spot market. We elicit the motivations behind this behavior and investigate
how the eﬀort level chosen by the worker diﬀers with the social proximity
between the worker and the referrer.
1.1 Part I: Political economy
By picking the election method one can immensely aﬀect the outcome of
the elections. There are two major voting rules that constitute the basis of
election systems today. Pluralistic voting is the basis of the voting systems
in France, the UK, Canada and the United States. It is also known as
winner-takes-all, since the party that receives the most number of votes
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wins the elections. On the other hand, under proportional representation
the number of seats won by a party is proportionate to the number of
votes received. This electoral rule is the basis of the voting systems in the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Israel and Spain.
Plurality rule gives the government an advantage in upcoming elections
since the government can arrange the voting districts in such a way that op-
position votes are divided and distributed to areas that dominantly support
the incumbent party. Moreover, voters may choose to vote for the candidate
they favor most among those who have a higher chance to win even when
it is not their true preference, because otherwise their votes will have no
impact on the outcome and therefore be wasted. Extremist political agen-
das and minorities are represented very limitedly under pluralistic voting.
In cases of low voter turnout during plurality type elections, a party might
gain political power disproportionate to its voter base. Under proportional
voting rule minorities get better representation, but after-election politics
gain much more importance. Parties form a coalition government and mi-
norities might even get too much power by strategic coalition formation. In
our analyses, we will leave after-election politics and welfare implications
aside and investigate how the choice of the electoral rule aﬀects the number
of parties formed and which agendas those parties would support.
Duverger’s law is a principle in political science that asserts a two-
party system will be formed when pluralistic voting rule is used when given
enough time. Duverger also has a hypothesis that proportional voting rule
leads to multipartyism. Our findings support these widely accepted predic-
tions.
Up to this point the political agenda space has been modeled as a line,
that is the standard Downsian model. The Downsian model and many
of its extensions mostly have nonrealistic convergence results, especially
to the median, under plurality voting. To get rid of one-party equilibria
some restrictive assumptions are introduced such as a restricted number
of parties joining the elections. Some other extensions of the model suﬀer
from a lack of equilibrium or existence of multiple equlibria and therefore
cannot predict much.
Although we are used to picturing the political agenda space as a line,
political ideology cannot be observed directly but can only be observed
2
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through its consequences. The political agenda space does not need to be
linear. The line that represents the agenda space is bounded from both
ends. This implies that there is a very extreme position at which point you
cannot be any more extreme and where two extreme positions are furthest
away from each other. However, political psychology describes extremism
as a personality attribute rather than a political stance. Extreme positions
may in fact not be so far away from each other. For example, take Iran
on the far-right and North Korea on the far-left, which nevertheless share
common points. Similarities of Nazism and Stalinism have also long been
discussed. Bringing the edges together, a circle is a good alternative for
a policy space. Another advantage of the circle is that it does not have
a median or edge players, hence it does not have the disadvantages we
mentioned above.
In our model, the political agenda space is the circumference of a cir-
cle of unit length. Any number of purely oﬃce-seeking politicians join the
elections and pick their agenda simultaneously. Any agenda supported by
one or more politicians is referred to as a party and incumbent politicians
cannot reject an entry of other politicians into the party. Voters are uni-
formly distributed on the agenda space and they sincerely vote for their
most preferred agenda. Under pluralistic voting, political power is divided
equally by the winning parties. Under proportional voting rule, the political
power of a party is proportional to the votes it receives. Under both rules,
this power is divided equally among the politicians in a given party, which
results in the personal gain of the politicians that they try to maximize.
A characterization for the set of Nash equilibria in this model is pre-
sented, however under plurality voting this set is quite wide and further
refinement is necessary for making a sharper prediction. Established equi-
librium refinement notions, strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium do not help much. The set of strong Nash equilibria is
empty under both election rules so this refinement seems too strong for this
setting. The set of CPNE is also empty under plurality rule and this char-
acterization is very complicated to undertake under proportional voting
rule.
Besides being too strong, these equilibrium concepts must also be tai-
lored to the specific needs of the party formation setting. Party formation
3
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is a dynamic process, however we do not see all sorts of deviations. We
see a shift in a party’s political agenda, a group splitting from a party and
starting a new party, merger of parties, but we do not see coordinated de-
viation of actors moving towards two distinct agendas. We alter the strong
Nash equilibrium notion and the CPNE notion by allowing only these types
of deviations.
The alteration of strong Nash equilibrium, namely Party-formation re-
stricted strong Nash equilibrium is already an improvement by making a
nonempty selection of equilibria. However the exact number of parties and
the existence of an equilibrium are not robust, they depend heavily on the
exact number of competing politicians. Finally the alteration of CPNE,
namely defection-proof Nash equilibrium makes robust predictions consis-
tent with real electoral outcomes.
The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the eﬀects of the electoral
rule on the number of parties formed and the agendas that are supported.
In chapter two existing literature is discussed, a formal model is developed,
and Nash equilibria and defection-proof Nash equilibria characterizations
are presented. Chapter three is devoted to the discussion of other equilib-
rium concepts in party formation setting. We exhibit which equilibria are
selected by strong Nash, Pf-restricted strong Nash, CPNE and defection-
proof Nash and address why defection-proof Nash equilibrium is the most
suitable equilibrium refinement for our study.
Our main contributions in this part is the use of a circle as a unidimen-
sional political agenda space, defining a party-formation specific equilib-
rium concept and finding game-theoretical support for Duverger’s predic-
tions. Circular political agenda space can further be utilized in researching
post-election politics. When a bill is put up to a vote for passing into
law, some parties will be for and some will be against it. While this can
be modeled in a very restricted way on the unit interval, it is much more
flexible on a circle since there are many more ways to divide a circle into
two parts. Defection-proof Nash equilibrium is also a new useful tool for
the analysis of party formation in a wide range of models including those
where the political agenda space is the unit interval.
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1.2 Part II: Behavioral economics
Google makes the claim that ”Good people know other good people. Our
best employees have been hired through referrals. Google encourages you
to recommend candidates for opportunities here and will award you a $2000
bonus if your referral accepts our oﬀer and remains employed for at least
60 days.” Microsoft, Cisco, Accenture and many more use these employee
referral programs. The use of social networks in the workplace has also been
documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread
prevalence are less well known.
Employee referrals are considered to be the most commonly used and
best source for new hires today. They shorten the search time and make
it less expensive for the employer since every employee has her personal
network to pool from and is equipped with the best information about the
candidate, job and the company hiring. This is advantageous compared
to one recruiter going over hundreds of applications none of whom she
knows personally. Jobvite, a recruitment website, announced that when an
employee is hired through referral she tends to stay longer in the company
as well. On the downside, employee referrals may compromise diversity of
the workforce and leave out excellent candidates who happen to be outside
the reach of the employees’ social networks.
For certain jobs talent and expertise are not the issue; trustworthiness
is what the employer is looking for. We want to know if employee referrals
are still relevant in these cases and if we can reduce moral hazard, induce
discipline and reduce monitoring costs by exploiting social connections be-
tween newly hired workers and employee referrers. Even when there is no
established social connection, if hiring is carried out by an employee refer-
rer, can this aﬀect the newly hired worker positively compared to random
hiring at the spot market by the employer? Can the job oﬀer be perceived
as a gift and be reciprocated?
In chapter four, we present evidence based on a combined field-laboratory
experiment where social networks are used by employers to reduce worker
moral hazard. The worker chooses an eﬀort level given a fixed wage under
diﬀerent settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using
actual Facebook friendship information revealed anonymously to subjects
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once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have
access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can
select among workers with diﬀerent degrees of social proximity to them-
selves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring
about 80% of the time. In keeping with our predictions, referrers also
choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers
who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The ad-
vantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate egalitarianism and directed
altruism as the main driving forces for these results.
We use the theoretical model of job referrals from Dhillon et al. (2013)
and test its predictions. The experiment is not a standard lab experiment
since it makes use of the real life information obtained through an online
networking website. This provides us with more reliable data compared
to those studies where a friendship relation is artificially created in the
lab setting. We asked participants for permission to access their Facebook
accounts and extract the information about their mutual friendship status
and the number of common friends they have. Revealing the identities of
the subjects would not have allowed us to disentangle the eﬀect of pure
friendship, prospects for future interactions or an attractive profile picture.
We supplied the participants with only the relevant information (and kept
them in separate rooms to avoid a guessing game), this way we could be sure
that any diﬀerence in participants’ behavior could confidently be attributed
to those aspects.
In chapter five, we present the results of our second experiment which
was carried out in a very similar fashion to the first one. We show that even
when social connections are non-existent, hiring through referral pays oﬀ.
If a worker can attribute a job oﬀer to the volitional choice of a referrer, she
is more likely to exert higher levels of eﬀort compared to random hiring.
Those two lab experiments were done with students with a general equi-
librium approach of testing the full mechanism of job referrals, including
the employer, the referrer, the worker, their interactions and strategies, not
just the worker-referrer relationship.
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Strategic Party Formation
on a Circle
2.1 Introduction
In democratic societies, collective decisions are made in legislatures. The
legislators are often grouped into parties. Party representation and config-
uration in turn depend on the political framework ( Rae (1971), Lijphart
(1990) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989)) and the particular strategies
adopted by the politicians, parties and voters within that framework. One
natural question is, how electoral systems aﬀect the number of parties that
form and their respective positions?1
Two famous predictions about the eﬀect of electoral systems on political
party formation are attributed to the political scientist, Maurice Duverger
(1954). Duverger’s law states that plurality voting favors a two-party sys-
tem. According to Duverger’s hypothesis, proportional representation fa-
vors multi-partyism. Therefore, the Duvergerian comparative prediction is
that the number of parties is larger under proportional representation than
under plurality voting (Riker (1982), Morelli (2004)).
Cox (1987), Palfrey (1989), Feddersen (1992) and Fey (1997) find the-
1This chapter is based on a paper jointly written by Ronald Peeters, Rene Saran and
Ays¸e Mu¨ge Yu¨ksel, which has been released as Meteor Research Memorandum (number
10/045).
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oretical support for Duverger’s law when the voters avoid wasting their
vote on “hopeless” candidates. Rivie`re (1998), and Osborne and Tourky
(2008) focus on economies of party size to explain the formation of political
parties. Other papers that explain the existence of parties, without par-
ticularly focusing on one of Duverger’s predictions, include Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Jackson and Moselle (2002),
Snyder and Ting (2002), and Levy (2004).
Morelli (2004) is the first to addresses both the law and hypothesis. He
shows that more than two parties may be active in a multi-district elec-
tion with plurality voting when there is suﬃcient heterogeneity in policy
preferences across districts. In addition, when the distribution of prefer-
ences is more aligned, the number of “eﬀective” parties under proportional
representation must be less than three. Thus, Morelli (2004) finds that
the Duvergerian comparative prediction may be violated in a multi-district
setting.
In this paper, we are interested in game-theoretic foundations of Du-
verger’s law and hypothesis. Unlike the previous theoretical literature on
Duverger’s predictions, we study a spatial model of multi-candidate com-
petition.2 The Downsian model of electoral competition (Downs (1957)),
where the set of agendas equals the unit interval, is not suitable for this
research. In this standard framework, a pure-strategy equilibria does not
exist under the proportional rule; whereas, the incentive to attract the me-
dian voter generates a single party in the pluralistic system when consid-
ering refinements that allow movements on party-level. This motivates our
point of departure from the standard framework: we instead assume that
the set of agendas equals the unit circle.3 We hereby follow in the success
of the industrial organization literature in studying multi-firm competition
by moving from Hotelling’s linear city (Hotelling (1929)) to Salop’s circular
city (Salop (1979)).4
2We solely focus on the pre-election process of strategic party formation. In particu-
lar, we ignore policy and welfare implications, and the impact of post-election coalition
formation on actual power.
3Some justification of using the circle as agenda space is provided in Section 2.2 in
which we present the model.
4According to Persson and Tabellini (2000, p.5),“It is hard to model the outcome of
multiparty competition ...”. As we will see, the transition to a circular agenda space may
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The summary description of the model is as follows. There are a fi-
nite number of politicians that simultaneously and independently choose
to promote agendas in the elections, where the set of agendas is the unit
circle. Politicians promoting the same agenda form a party. Hence, the
party structure follows directly from the politicians’ decisions to promote
agendas. We assume that the voters are uniformly distributed over the
unit circle, with each voter’s most preferred agenda coinciding with her
location on the circle. Furthermore, voters are assumed to vote sincerely,
i.e., support the party closest to their most preferred agendas. This as-
sumption results in the vote share of each party to be proportional to its
distance to the two adjacent parties. Next, the electoral system determines
a mapping from the distribution of votes to the distribution of “power”.
In the pluralitarian system, the parties with the highest vote share gain
all power (winner takes all); in the proportional system, the power of each
party equals its vote share. We assume that the politicians belonging to a
party share equally in its power, and each politician is opportunistic (oﬃce-
motivated), trying to maximize her individual power. Hence, in general,
each politician prefers to become a member of a party with a high vote
share but as few other members as possible.
We provide a full characterization of the sets of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in both the pluralitarian and proportional systems, and show
that these sets are nonempty. Typically, both systems possess a rich set of
Nash equilibria.5 Therefore, we define the notion of defection-proofness to
refine the Nash equilibrium predictions.
Defection-proof Nash equilibrium is similar in motivation to coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987), but only allows for particu-
lar deviations, which we call defections.6 The defections include deviations
be a step forward.
5A high multiplicity of (types of) equilibria is also found in a two-stage location-
quantity game along the circle’s circumference in Gupta et al. (2004).
6The set of defection-proof Nash equilibria includes the set of strong Nash equilibria
(Aumann (1959)). However, there is no logical relation between the sets of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria and defection-proof Nash equilibria. A defection-proof Nash equilibrium
is immune to self-enforcing or credible defections by any coalition (i.e., defections from
which there are no further credible defections by any subcoalition). On the other hand,
a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is immune to credible deviations by any coalition
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by a coalition of politicians that are typically observed in reality; for in-
stance, shifts in agenda, mergers of parties, and a set of politicians splitting
from their original parties and forming a new party or joining an existing
one.7
In the pluralitarian system, we show that Nash equilibria that gener-
ate strictly more than three parties are not defection-proof, whereas only
multiple parties are supported as defection-proof Nash equilibrium under
the proportional rule. Our defection-proof Nash equilibrium predictions
are only partially consistent with Duvergers law – we predict either two or
three parties under pluralitarian system – but they fully support Duvergers
hypothesis and the Duvergerian comparative prediction.
In Section 2.2, we present the details of the model and the definition of
defection-proofness. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we present, respectively, the
equilibrium analysis for the pluralitarian and proportional systems. We
conclude in Section 2.5 by summarizing our results. Proofs are collected in
Section 2.6.
2.2 Model
There is a finite set of politicians, I, with |I| ≥ 3.8 The set of agendas,
A, is the circumference of a circle of unit length. An agenda is denoted by
a. The politicians simultaneously choose to support agendas. We restrict
attention to pure strategies. Therefore, A is the set of strategies for each
politician. A strategy profile is denoted by s. For any J ⊆ I, sJ denotes
(i.e., deviations from which there are no further credible deviations by any subcoalition).
The set of possible defections by a coalition is a subset of the set of deviations by that
coalition. Nevertheless, the set of credible defections by a coalition is not necessarily a
subset or superset of the set of credible deviations.
7Duverger already reasoned that the field of parties is trimmed to just two by the
forces of “fusion” and elimination (Fey (1997)). According to Kaminski (2006), “party
politics revolves around the emergence of new parties [and] electoral splits and coalitions.”
In Eguia (2010), the stability of a party configuration or voting bloc in an assembly is
defined with respect to immunity of the current configuration against fourteen classes of
deviations. Our definition of defections includes twelve of these classes – exception being
classes D1 and D3 in which a subset of politicians deviate to become independents or
singleton parties. Hence, considering only defections does not seem to be too restrictive.
8|X| is the cardinality of set X.
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the strategy profile (si)i∈J and s−J denotes the strategy profile (si)i∈I\J .
A strategy profile s defines a partition P(s) of the set of politicians,
where each P ∈ P(s) is such that for some agenda a, si = a for all i ∈ P
and sj ̸= a for all j ̸∈ P . That is, every politician who belongs to P
supports the same agenda a in the profile s and none of the politicians
outside P support the agenda a. We will refer to any P ∈ P(s) as a party.
Hence, P(s) is the set of all parties formed in the strategy profile s. The
agenda supported by a party P ∈ P(s) is the unique agenda supported by
every politician who belongs to P . For any P ∈ P(s), let Rs(P ) be the
first party that is supporting an agenda in the clockwise direction starting
at the agenda supported by P . Similarly, let Ls(P ) be the first party that
is supporting an agenda in the counterclockwise direction starting at the
agenda supported by P . Any two parties P,P ′ ∈ P(s) are adjacent if
P ′ ∈ {Ls(P ), Rs(P )}.
Voters are uniformly distributed on A.9 Each voter’s location on A is
her most-preferred agenda. Voters are assumed to vote sincerely for the
party supporting the agenda closest to her most-preferred agenda; in case
there are two such parties, she votes for each with equal probability – there
cannot be more than two such parties since the set of agendas is a circle.
Before we continue with introducing further definitions and concepts, we
believe a justification for using the circle as agenda space is needed. First,
it is not uncommon for voters on the extreme-left and on the extreme-right
to agree on some political issues (often called the horseshoe theory, Faye
(1996)). Both extremes typically disapprove immigration; labor unions
because aliens take their jobs and white supremacists because they don’t
like aliens. They also share a similar distaste for foreign aid; left because
foreign aid usually ends up in the hands of corrupt elites and bolsters
pro-market policies and right because it bolsters ineﬃcient public sector.
Moreover, even on issues where extreme political positions do not coincide,
political psychology tells us that extremists choose from one of the extremes
rather than a closer moderate position (Nozick (1997)).
The weight of a party P ∈ P(s), denoted by wP (s), is the proportion
9This assumption is restrictive and not necessarily realistic but it provides us a man-
ageable tool to demonstrate the connecting and splitting forces created as basic implica-
tions of pluralistic and proportional rules.
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of voters who vote for party P . We term the length of the arc between the
agenda supported by P and agenda supported by Ls(P ) as the left distance
of party P and denote it by ls(P ). Similarly, the length of the arc between
the agenda supported by P and agenda supported by Rs(P ) will be called
the right distance of party P and denoted by rs(P ). It is straightforward
to show that wP (s) =
ls(P )+rs(P )
2 (see Figure 2.1). Note that wP (s) ≥ 0 for
all P ∈ P(s) and
∑
P∈P(s) wP (s) = 1. Then w(s) = (wP (s))P∈P(s) is the
distribution of weights under the strategy profile s.
Ls(P )
P
Rs(P )
Figure 2.1: P is an arbitrary party, Ls(P ) and Rs(P ) denote the first parties
located in each direction from P . The dotted lines demarcate arcs that define the
distance between adjacent parties. The thick lines demarcate arcs that define each
party’s voter base or weight. The weight of a party is the average of its left and
right distances.
A rule ρ defines for every strategy profile s, the power ρP (w(s)) of
each party P ∈ P(s) as a function of the distribution of weights w(s).
We assume that the politicians belonging to a party share equally in its
power. Furthermore, politicians receive utility equal to their individual
power – such oﬃce-motivated politicians are standard in the literature.
Hence, the utility of politician i in strategy profile s is ui(s) =
ρP (w(s))
|P | ,
where i ∈ P ∈ P(s).
For any rule ρ, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if there do
not exist i ∈ I and s′i ∈ A such that ui(s
′
i, s−i) > ui(si, s−i). Thus, Nash
equilibrium strategies are stable against unilateral deviations by a single
politician. However, Nash equilibrium disregards the possibility of coordi-
nated deviations or defections by a coalition of politicians.
Definition 1 (Defection). A defection (or a strictly beneficial defection)
12
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from a strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I is a strategy profile for
coalition J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such that sj ̸= s′j = a for all j ∈ J , and uj(s
′
J , s−J) >
uj(sJ , s−J) for all j ∈ J .10
Thus, a defection is a deviation from a strategy profile by a coalition of
politicians that satisfies two requirements: first, all the members of the
coalition deviate to the same agenda and second, all the members of the
coalition must strictly improve their utilities after the deviation. The fol-
lowing are some examples of defections:
• Shift in a party’s agenda: All the politicians in a party decide to shift
the agenda supported by their party.
• Split in a party: A subset of politicians belonging to a party forms a
new party by supporting a diﬀerent agenda.
• Merger of parties: All the politicians in two or more parties choose
to support a new common agenda.
• A set of politicians split from their original parties and merge at a
new or some previously supported agenda.
Such defections are quite common in politics and therefore, we allow for
them in our model. However, unless binding agreements are possible among
the defecting coalition, the defection must be self-enforcing or credible.
Definition 2 (Credible Defection).
(i) A credible defection from a strategy profile s by a politician j ∈ I is
a s′j ∈ A such that s
′
j is a defection from s by politician j.
10It is standard to assume that while contemplating a deviation, a coalition considers
the strategy of the complement as fixed. Moreover, one could imagine a stronger notion
of defection that requires that in case the defecting coalition chooses an agenda that
is already supported by another party, then the politicians in the latter party should
also be better oﬀ. The resulting notion of defection-proof Nash equilibrium can easily
be shown to make precisely the same selection among Nash equilibria. However, this
stronger definition of defection is not consistent with Nash equilibrium. After all, in
Nash equilibrium, we consider defections by single politicians but do not care in case
such a defection makes the party that this single politician joins worse oﬀ. Therefore, we
stick with the current weaker notion of defection.
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(ii) A credible defection from a strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I
such that |J | > 1 is a strategy profile for coalition J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such
that s′J is a defection from s by coalition J and there does not exist
any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J with a credible defection from (s′J , s−J).
Thus, a credible defection by a coalition is such that no further credible
defection is possible by any proper subcoalition.
Definition 3 (Defection-Proof Nash Equilibrium). A defection-proof Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that there is no credible defection
from s by any coalition J ⊆ I.
Defection-proof Nash equilibria are stable against credible defections by
any coalition. Clearly, the set of defection-proof Nash equilibria is a subset
of the set of Nash equilibria.
We restrict attention to two specific rules, plurality rule and proportional
rule. Under the plurality rule, all parties with the maximum weight share
power equally whereas any party with less than the maximum weight gets
zero power.11 Formally, for any strategy profile s, the plurality rule defines
the power of any P ∈ P(s) as
PlP (w(s)) ≡
⎧⎨
⎩
1
| argmaxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s)|
if P ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s)
0 otherwise.
Under the proportional rule, the power of a party equals its weight. Hence,
for any strategy profile s, the proportional rule defines the power of any
P ∈ P(s) as
PrP (w(s)) ≡ wP (s).
In the following two sections, we characterize the Nash equilibria and
defection-proof Nash equilibria for the games induced by these two vot-
ing rules. We have also investigated alternative refinements of Nash equi-
librium, like strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
11More than one parties winning the elections under plurality rule, i.e. receiving exactly
the same amount of votes, practically do not happen. We define this case for the sake of
completeness and utilities can be interpreted as expected utilities having equal chances
of winning.
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(CPNE). Under both voting rules, the set of strong Nash equilibria is empty.
For the proportional voting rule, we find that in any CPNE, all parties are
singleton, i.e., have only one politician. A characterization of CPNE under
plurality rule is technically challenging. The reason is that CPNE allows
for too many coalitional deviations, some of which we regard implausible
(i.e., deviations for which we did not find any empirical support) in the
present context.12 Our notion of defection-proof Nash equilibrium aims to
implement the notion of CPNE while restricting coalitional deviations to
the plausible ones.13
2.3 Plurality Rule
We begin with the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria under the
plurality rule.
Theorem 1. Under plurality rule, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties in P(s) diﬀer
by at most 1, and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for some P ∈ P(s).
(ii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ |I|2 and all parties have equal weights.
(iii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 4, |P(s)| > |I|2 and all parties are equidistant from each
other.
(iv) 5 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 6, |P(s)| > |I|2 , all parties are equidistant from each
other, and there does not exist any pair of singleton parties that are
adjacent.
Thus, whether s is a Nash equilibrium or not depends only on two factors:
first, the respective distances between the agendas supported in s – which
determine the weights of the parties – and second, the numbers of politicians
12One diﬀerence to CPNE concept is the assumption Defection-proof NE makes about
the behavior of politicians. Coordinated moves of politicians are expected to be made to
the same political agenda, which is a conceivable assumption in the political setting.
13Calculations are available upon request.
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in the parties formed in s. Hence, if s is a Nash equilibrium, then the
strategy profile s′ obtained by either shifting the agendas supported by all
politicians by a fixed constant or permuting the identities of the politicians
will also be a Nash equilibrium. This is obviously because of the particular
specification of the utilities of the politicians.
An important property of Nash equilibrium under the plurality rule
is that all parties formed in equilibrium have equal weight (see Lemma 9
in Proofs section). This is because only those parties with the maximum
weight obtain positive power. Hence, if a party has less than the maximum
weight, then a politician belonging to that party obtains zero utility but
could obtain positive utility by deviating to an agenda supported by some
party (more precisely, any party with the highest weight in the hypothetical
situation in which the set of politicians is I \ {i}, where i is the deviating
politician, and these politicians choose agendas according to the strategy
profile s−i). The weight of a party is the average of its left and right
distances. Thus, it follows that the sums of the left and right distances of
all parties formed in equilibrium are equal. Since the right (left) distance of
party P k is trivially equal to the left (right) distance of Rs(P k) (Ls(P k)),
it follows that the left (right) distance of a party P k equals the right (left)
distance of party Rs(P k) (Ls(P k)). Therefore, if {P 1, . . . , Pn} is the set
of parties that form in Nash equilibrium and, without loss of generality,
P k+1 = Rs(P k) for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1, then we obtain the following two
sequences of equalities:
ls(P 1) = rs(P 2) = ls(P 3) = rs(P 4) = . . . (2.1)
ls(Pn) = rs(P 1) = ls(P 2) = rs(P 3) = . . .
In words, if we move along the circle in the clockwise direction, then every
other arc defined by the set of agendas supported in equilibrium has the
same length.
The property that all parties have equal weights in equilibrium, gener-
ates two possible configurations of parties in equilibrium:
(i) An odd number of parties form in equilibrium. Then all parties must
be equidistant from each other. To see this, suppose n = 5, i.e.,
five parties P 1, . . . , P 5 form in equilibrium (see Figure 2.2(1)). Using
16
2.3. Plurality Rule
(2.1), we obtain
ls(P 1)=rs(P 2)= ls(P 3)=rs(P 4)= ls(P 5)=rs(P 1)
rs(P 1)= ls(P 2)=rs(P 3)= ls(P 4)=rs(P 5).
Since the parties are equidistant, the set of agendas supported in
equilibrium s can be graphically visualized as the vertices of an n-
sided convex regular polygon (as shown in Figure 2.2(2)).
P 1
P 2
P 3P 4
P 5
(1)
P 1
P 2
P 3P 4
P 5
(2)
Figure 2.2: Odd number (> 1) of parties under plurality rule: (1) All parties
have equal weight and are equidistant. (2) The locations of the parties are the
vertices of a convex regular polygon.
(ii) An even number of parties form in equilibrium. First, consider the
case when more than two parties form. Then both equidistant and
non-equidistant configurations are possible. Figure 2.3 shows these
configurations with six parties. In general, we can graphically visual-
ize the set of agendas supported in equilibrium as follows. Since the
parties have equal weights, we have
ls(P 2) + rs(P 2) = ls(P 4) + rs(P 4) = ls(P 6) + rs(P 6) = . . .
But ls(P 2) + rs(P 2) is the distance between the agendas supported
by parties P 1 and P 3; ls(P 4) + rs(P 4) is the distance between the
agendas supported by parties P 3 and P 5 and so on. Hence, all odd-
numbered parties (P 1, P 3, . . . , Pn−3, Pn−1) are equidistant from each
other and thus, the agendas supported by these parties are vertices of
17
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an n2 -sided convex regular polygon (as shown in Figure 2.4(2)). Sim-
ilarly, all even-numbered parties (P 2, P 4, . . . , Pn−2, Pn) are equidis-
tant from each other and the agendas supported by these parties are
also vertices of an n2 -sided convex regular polygon (as shown in Fig-
ure 2.4(2)). If in addition, all parties are equidistant from each other,
then the agendas supported by all parties are vertices of an n-sided
convex regular polygon (as shown in Figure 2.4(1)).
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(1)
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(2)
Figure 2.3: Even number (> 2) of parties under plurality rule: All parties have
equal weight but both equidistant (shown in (1)) and non-equidistant (shown in
(2)) configurations are possible. In (2), all even-numbered parties are equidistant
from each other and all odd-numbered parties are equidistant from each other.
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(1)
P 1 P 2
P 3
P 4P 5
P 6
(2)
Figure 2.4: Even number (> 2) of parties under plurality rule: (1) When all
parties are equidistant, their locations are the vertices of a convex regular polygon.
(2) When parties are not equidistant, the locations of all even-numbered/odd-
numbered parties are the vertices of a convex regular polygon.
When only two parties form in equilibrium, each party has a weight of
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1
2 . In this case, it must be that the minimum distance between the two
parties is greater than 13 . Otherwise, a single politician from the party
having the larger number of politicians – who obtains a utility of at most 14
as she shares power of 12 with at least one other politician – can deviate to
the agenda in the middle of the longer arc between the agendas supported
by the two parties. The left and right distances of this new singleton party
will be both at least 13 and hence, it will have at least as much weight as
the other two parties. Thus, the deviating politician will obtain a utility of
at least 13 , which is a contradiction.
The utility of a politician is a function both of the weight of her party
and the number of other politicians who belong to her party. Since all
parties have the same weight in equilibrium, a politician in party P ob-
tains 1|P | proportion of the weight. If there is another party P
′ such that
|P | > |P ′|+ 1, then a politician from party P could deviate to the agenda
supported by P ′, increasing her utility to 1|P ′|+1 proportion of the weight.
Therefore, the numbers of politicians in any two parties in P(s) diﬀer by
at most 1 in equilibrium.
It also follows from the theorem that the number of parties formed in
equilibrium is bounded below by 2 and above by max{ |I|2 , 6}. Any strategy
profile in which only a single party is formed is not an equilibrium since by
deviating to any other agenda, any politician can form a singleton party
with the weight of 12 and hence, increase her utility from at most
1
3 – since
|I| ≥ 3 – to 12 . On the other hand, suppose the number of parties formed
in equilibrium is greater than both |I|2 and 6. Figure 2.5(1) shows such a
strategy profile when |I| = 17 but nine parties form. Then at least one
party, say P 2, is singleton and the utility of this politician is less than 16
(see figure). Since the numbers of politicians in any two parties cannot
diﬀer by more than 1, both P 1 = Ls(P 2) and P 3 = Rs(P 2) have at most
two members. Without loss of generality, let rs(P 2) ≤ ls(P 2). If the single
politician in P 2 were to deviate to the agenda supported by P 3 (as shown in
Figure 2.5(2)), then the weight of party P 3 ∪P 2 will increase by l
s(P 2)
2 and
the weight of P 1 by r
s(P 2)
2 , while the weights of all other parties will stay
constant as the agendas supported by their respective adjacent parties stay
fixed. Since we started with a situation of equal weights, the merged party
P 3 ∪ P 2 will have the maximum weight and hence, through this deviation,
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the politician will obtain a utility of at least 16 as she shares the power of at
least 12 with at most two other members, which is a contradiction. The
|P 1| = 2
|P 2| = 1
|P 3| = 2
|P 4| = 2
|P 5| = 2|P 6| = 2
|P 7| = 2
|P 8| = 2
|P 9| = 2
(1)
|P 1| = 2
|P 3 ∪ P 2|
= 3
|P 4| = 2
|P 5| = 2|P 6| = 2
|P 7| = 2
|P 8| = 2
|P 9| = 2
(2)
Figure 2.5: Number of parties is bounded above by max{ |I|
2
, 6}: Assume |I| = 17.
(1) A strategy profile in which 9 parties form. (2) A unilateral deviation by the
politician in P 2 that increases her utility.
following corollary immediately follows from the above theorem.
Corollary 2. For any |I| ≥ 3, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
under plurality rule.
Indeed, the model under plurality rule has multiple Nash equilibria, with
the number of political parties in equilibrium ranging from 2 to max{ |I|2 , 6}.
Next, we refine our predictions using defection-proofness. The following
theorem characterizes the set of defection-proof Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3. Under plurality rule, a strategy profile s is a defection-proof
Nash equilibrium if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties
in P(s) diﬀer by at most 1 and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for some P ∈ P(s).
(ii) |P(s)| = 3 and all parties are equidistant from each other.
Thus, defection-proofness sharply refines the set of Nash equilibria: only
those Nash equilibria in which either two or three parties form are defection-
proof Nash equilibria. To see why Nash equilibria with at least four parties
are not defection-proof, let’s consider a Nash equilibrium s in which parties
P 1, . . . , Pn form, where n ≥ 4, and all parties are equidistant, with the
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distance equal to d (the proof takes care of all cases). Let a be the agenda
that is the midpoint of the agendas supported by P 2 and P 3 (as shown in
Figure 2.6(1)). Now, if a coalition consisting of all politicians in P 2 and
P 3 were to deviate to supporting a, ceteris paribus, then n − 1 parties,
viz. {P 1, P 2 ∪ P 3, P 4, . . . , Pn}, will be formed in the resulting profile s′
(as shown in Figure 2.6(2)). The weight of the party P 2 ∪ P 3 will be 32d,
while the weights of P 1 and P 4 will each be 54d, and the weights of all
other parties will remain unchanged. Since we started with a situation of
equal weights, the merged party P 2 ∪ P 3 will be the unique party with
the maximum weight and hence, each member of the deviating coalition
will obtain a utility of 1|P 2|+|P 3| compared to the utility of either
1
n|P 2| or
1
n|P 3| in profile s. Since n ≥ 4 and the numbers of politicians in parties
P 2 and P 3 do not diﬀer from each other by more than 1 – since s is a
Nash equilibrium –, we have n|P 2| ≥ 4|P 2| > 2|P 2| + 1 ≥ |P 2| + |P 3|
and similarly, n|P 3| > |P 2| + |P 3|. Thus, each member of the deviating
coalition will be strictly better oﬀ after the deviation and hence, we have
obtained a defection from s by coalition P 2 ∪ P 3. This defection is in fact
credible. Consider any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ P 2 ∪ P 3. If starting from s′, all
members of J ′ were to deviate to an agenda like a′, which lies on the arc
between the agendas supported by P 1 and P 4 that does not contain a (see
Figure 2.6(2)), then at least as many agendas as in s′ will be supported in
the resulting profile s′′. However, the weight of party P 2 ∪ P 3 \ J ′ will not
change while the weight of any other party will be at most 54d. Hence, the
subcoalition J ′ cannot improve its utility by this deviation. On the other
hand, if starting from s′, all members of J ′ were to deviate to an agenda
like a′′ or a′′′, which lie between a and the agenda supported by either P 1
or P 4 (see Figure 2.6(2)), then the weight of party J ′ will be 34d, which is
less than the weight of P 2 ∪P 3 \ J ′. Thus, J ′ cannot improve its utility by
such a deviation. Hence, we conclude that the initial defection from s is a
credible defection.
In contrast, all Nash equilibria in which either two or three parties form
are defection-proof Nash equilibria. Let’s consider a Nash equilibrium s as
shown in Figure 2.7(1) with three parties, P 1, P 2 and P 3 (the argument
for two parties is similar). First, consider a defection in which all three
parties merge, resulting in s′ with a single agenda being supported. Since
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P 1
P 2
a
P 3P 4
P 5
(1)
P 1
a′′
a supported
by P 2 ∪ P 3
a′′′
P 4
P 5
a′
(2)
Figure 2.6: Nash equilibria with more than 3 parties are not defection-proof: (1)
A Nash equilibrium with 5 parties. (2) A credible defection by P 2 ∪ P 3.
P1
P2P3
(1)
P1 ∪ P2
∪{j1, j2}
P3 \ {j1, j2}
(2)
P1 ∪ {j1, j2, j3}
P2 \ {j3}P3 \ {j1, j2}
(3)
P1 ∪ {j1, j2, j3}
P2 \ {j3}P3 \ {j1, j2}
(4)
Figure 2.7: Nash equilibria with 3 parties are defection-proof: (1) A Nash equi-
librium with 3 parties. (2) There do not exist defections that result in only two
supported agendas. (3) and (4) show that possible defections from (1) which result
in three supported agendas are not beneficial to those who defect.
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s′ is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a credible defection from s′ by a
single politician belonging to the initial defecting coalition. Thus, the initial
defection cannot be credible. Second, consider a defection in which all
politicians, except some in say P 3, merge, resulting in s′ with two agendas
being supported (as shown in Figure 2.7(2)). Thus, instead of 13|P 1| , a
defecting politician belonging to P 1 obtains a utility of at most 12|P 1|+2|P 2|
after the defection. But 2|P 1| + 2|P 2| ≥ 2|P 1| + |P 2| + 1 ≥ 3|P 1|, where
the last inequality follows from the fact that the numbers of politicians in
parties P 1 and P 2 do not diﬀer from each other by more than 1. Thus,
any politician belonging to P 1 will not improve her utility through this
defection, a contradiction. Third, any defection that results in a s′ in
which three agendas are supported must be such that at least two agendas
supported in s, say those of P 2 and P 3, are also supported in s′. That is,
some politicians belonging to P 2 and P 3 are not members of the defecting
coalition. If the party formed supports an agenda which is diﬀerent than
the agenda supported by P1 in s, then it has a weight of
1
3 (Figure 2.7(3))
or 16 (Figure 2.7(4)) depending on the arc on which the agenda is placed.
In both cases, there is at least one party with a weight of strictly more
than 13 . Therefore, the party formed has zero power and so the defection
is not beneficial. If the party formed supports the agenda supported by P1
in s, then all three agendas supported in s are also supported in s′. But
such a defection even by a single politician is not beneficial since s is a
Nash equilibrium. Finally, any defection that results in an s′ in which four
agendas are supported must be such that all three agendas supported in
s are also supported in s′ (note that there does not exist a defection that
results in five or more supported agendas). But this cannot be beneficial
for the same reasoning above. Thus there is no credible defection from s
by any coalition.
As a corollary, we easily obtain the following result:
Corollary 4. For any |I| ≥ 3, there exists a defection-proof Nash equilib-
rium under plurality rule.
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2.4 Proportional Rule
In this section, we study the formation of political parties under the pro-
portional rule. Like in the plurality rule, the vote share or weight of any
party is equal to the average of its left and right distances. However, in
contrast, now every party has positive power equal to its weight. As the
next theorem shows, this substantially alters the configurations of political
parties that form in Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5. Under proportional rule, s is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if for any party P ∈ P(s) either
(i) |P | = 2 and ls(P ) = rs(P ) = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)} or
(ii) |P | = 1 and ls(P ) + rs(P ) ≥ maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
According to the theorem, all parties have at most two politicians in any
Nash equilibrium.14 To see this, suppose a party P has at least three
politicians in a Nash equilibrium s (as shown in Figure 2.8(1)). The weight
of this party equals l
s(P )+rs(P )
2 . Since P has at least three politicians, any
politician in P obtains a utility of at most l
s(P )+rs(P )
6 . If any politician
in P were to unilaterally deviate to an agenda on the arc corresponding
to max{ls(P ), rs(P )}, then she would form a new singleton party with
weight max{l
s(P ),rs(P )}
2 (as shown in Figure 2.8(2)). Clearly,
ls(P )+rs(P )
6 <
max{ls(P ),rs(P )}
2 . Hence, a strategy profile in which there exists a party with
at least three politicians cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, in any Nash equilibrium, any party with two politicians must
be equidistant from the parties that are adjacent to it, with the distance
equal to d∗ = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}, i.e., the maximum distance be-
tween any two adjacent parties. If not, then any politician in such a party
P shares a weight of l
s(P )+rs(P )
2 < d
∗ with the other politician in P and
hence, obtains l
s(P )+rs(P )
4 <
d∗
2 . If this politician were to unilaterally de-
viate to an agenda on any arc corresponding to d∗, she would increase her
utility to d
∗
2 , which is a contradiction to Nash equilibrium.
14In political arenas we do not observe parties with only two or very small number
of politicians due to economies of scale. Cost of running for elections is out of our
scope; nevertheless this result provides strong evidence on the proportional voting system
inducing formation of smaller parties in greater number.
24
2.4. Proportional Rule
Ls(P )
|P | > 3
Rs(P )P ′
(1)
Ls(P )
{i}
P \ {i}
Rs(P )P ′
(2)
Figure 2.8: All parties in Nash equilibrium have at most 2 members: (1) A
strategy profile with |P | > 3. (2) A unilateral deviation by some i ∈ P that
increases i’s utility.
Finally, the second condition in the theorem says that any singleton
party in any Nash equilibrium must obtain a weight of at least d
∗
2 . The
politician in a singleton party obtains a utility equal to her party’s weight.
Therefore, if the second condition were violated, this politician could uni-
laterally deviate to an agenda on any arc corresponding to d∗ and increase
her utility to d
∗
2 .
An upper bound of two on the membership of any party in Nash equi-
librium implies that a large number of parties form under the proportional
rule when the number of politicians is not too small. In particular, the
number of parties in any Nash equilibrium must be at least |I|2 , if |I| is
even, and at least |I|+12 , if |I| is odd. Furthermore, every integer number of
political parties, starting from |I|2 or
|I|+1
2 up to |I|, can be found in some
Nash equilibrium. To see this, pick any integer n in the interval [ |I|2 , |I|] and
construct an n-sided regular convex polygon in the unit circle. The agendas
corresponding to the vertices of this polygon are equidistant by construc-
tion. Therefore, any distribution of the politicians over these agendas such
that each agenda has at least one and at most two politicians satisfies the
conditions in the theorem and hence, it is a Nash equilibrium (for example,
see Figure 2.9(1)). However, it is not necessary that the agendas supported
in Nash equilibrium are equidistant. For instance, consider the case when
|I| = 10. Then the following strategy profile with nine parties is a Nash
equilibrium: there is a single party with two politicians and at a distance
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of 211 from each of its adjacent parties, and the rest of the eight singleton
parties are at a distance of 111 from each other (see Figure 2.9(2)).
|P 1| = 2
|P 2| = 1
|P 3| = 1
|P 4| = 1
|P 5| = 1|P 6| = 1
|P 7| = 1
|P 8| = 1
|P 9| = 1
(1)
|P 1| = 2
|P 2| = 1
|P 3| = 1
|P 4| = 1
|P 5| = 1|P 6| = 1
|P 7| = 1
|P 8| = 1
|P 9| = 1
(2)
Figure 2.9: |I| = 10. (1) Nash equilibrium with 9 equidistant parties. (2) Nash
equilibrium with 9 parties that are not equidistant.
The following corollary follows from the theorem (see the discussion in
the previous paragraph).
Corollary 6. For any |I| ≥ 3, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
under proportional rule.
We also have multiple Nash equilibria under the proportional rule, with the
number of political parties that can form in Nash equilibrium ranging from
|I|
2 or
|I|+1
2 up to |I|. Like for the plurality rule, we now use the notion
of defection-proofness with the aim of refining the set of Nash equilibria.
However, in contrast to the plurality rule, defection-proofness does not
narrow down the set of Nash equilibria under the proportional rule.
Theorem 7. Under proportional rule, s is a defection-proof Nash equilib-
rium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
As we argue in the proof, any defection s′J from a Nash equilibrium s by a
coalition J to an agenda a such that at least three politicians support a in
the resulting strategy profile (s′J , s−J) cannot be credible. This is because
of the same reason why any strategy profile in which there exists a party
with at least three politicians is not a Nash equilibrium: any politician in
the party supporting a, and hence in J , can unilaterally deviate to improve
her utility, which is a credible defection from (s′J , s−J).
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Ls(P ′)
a
P ′
Rs(P ′) = P ′′Rs(P ′′)
(1)
Ls(P ′)
a supported
by J
P ′
Rs(P ′) = P ′′Rs(P ′′)
(2)
Ls(P ′)
a supported
by J ⊇ P ′
Rs(P ′) = P ′′Rs(P ′′)
(3)
Ls(P ′)
a supported by
J ⊇ P ′ ∪ P ′′
Rs(P ′′)
(4)
Figure 2.10: (1) Nash equilibrium s. There does not exist a defection by J to
agenda a such that: (2) The agendas supported by P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s are also
supported in s′. (3) The agendas supported by Ls(P ′) and Rs(P ′) in s are also
supported in s′ but the agenda supported by P ′ in s is not supported in s′. (4) The
agenda supported by Ls(P ′) in s is also supported in s′ but the agendas supported
by P ′ and Rs(P ′) in s are not supported in s′.
Thus, if there exists a credible defection from s, it must involve a coali-
tion J with exactly two politicians – a defection by a single politician does
not exist since s is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the credible defection
must be to an agenda a that is not supported by any party in s, i.e., a must
lie between the agendas supported by two adjacent parties in s, say P ′ and
Ls(P ′) (as shown in Figure 2.10(1)). We argue that there does not exist
any such defection from s. To see this, first suppose that both the agendas
supported by P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s are also supported in s′ = (s′J , s−J) (as
shown in Figure 2.10(2)). Then in the strategy profile s′, the utility of each
politician in J equals l
s(P ′)
4 . If this were a defection from s, increasing the
utility of both politicians in J over their utilities in the strategy profile s,
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then s could not have been a Nash equilibrium. This is because when the
strategy profile is s, any single politician in J could unilaterally deviate to a
and obtain the utility l
s(P ′)
2 as she now forms a singleton party supporting
an agenda between the agendas supported by P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s, which
remain supported after her deviation. Next, suppose that only the agenda
supported by Ls(P ′) in s is supported in s′. Then all the politicians in
P ′ must be part of the defecting coalition J . If the agenda supported by
Rs(P ′) in s is also supported in s′ (as shown in Figure 2.10(3)), then the
utility of any politician in P ′ in s′ cannot be greater than her utility in s
since the weight of her party is the same in both profiles. On the other
hand, if the agenda supported by Rs(P ′) in s is not supported in s′ (as
shown in Figure 2.10(4)), then all the politicians in Rs(P ′) must also be
part of the defecting coalition. But if two diﬀerent parties in s are part
of the defecting coalition and the size of the defecting coalition is equal to
two, then each of the defecting parties must be singleton. Moreover, letting
P ′′ = Rs(P ′), it must be that none of the politicians in Rs(P ′′) are part
of J . Therefore, each politician in J obtains l
s(P ′)+rs(P ′)+rs(P ′′)
4 after the
defection. This is no more than l
s(P ′)+rs(P ′)
2 , the utility of the politician
in the singleton party P ′ in s, because ls(P ′) + rs(P ′) is at least equal to
the maximum distance between any two adjacent parties in s (second con-
dition in Theorem 5). The argument in the other two cases – when only
the agenda supported by P ′ in s is supported in s′ and when neither the
agenda supported by P ′ nor by Ls(P ′) in s is supported in s′ – is similar.
Since there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under the propor-
tional rule, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 8. For any |I| ≥ 3, there exists a defection-proof Nash equilib-
rium under proportional rule.
2.5 Summary
Our aim in this paper was to study whether the predictions of Duverger
(1954) have game theoretic foundations in a spatial model. Unfortunately,
the standard model with a linear set of agendas does not provide satisfac-
tory answers to this question; the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria is
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empty under the proportional rule whereas it is singleton under the plu-
rality rule for refinements that allow explicit coordination on party-level.
This motivated us to instead use the set of agendas equal to the unit circle.
As we have shown, this departure generates significantly diﬀerent results;
we now have multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria under both rules. We
used the notion of defection-proof Nash equilibrium to refine our predic-
tions. Under the plurality rule, either two or three parties form in any
defection-proof Nash equilibrium. This result is partially consistent with
Duverger’s law since there exists defection-proof Nash equilibria with three
parties. On the other hand, under the proportional rule, multiple parties
form in any defection-proof Nash equilibrium. Thus, Duverger’s hypothesis
and the Duvergian comparative prediction are supported by our results.
2.6 Proofs
Plurality Rule
Proof of Theorem 1: We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 9. If s is a Nash equilibrium with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then all parties in
P(s) have equal weights.
Proof. Suppose s is a Nash equilibrium with |P(s)| ≥ 2 but there exists
a P ∈ P(s) such that wP (s) < maxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s). Hence, PlP (w(s)) = 0
and ui(s) = 0 for all i ∈ P . Pick any politician i ∈ P and party Pˆ ∈
argmaxP ′∈P(s) wP ′(s). Consider the strategy profile (s
′
i, s−i) such that s
′
i =
aˆ, where aˆ is the agenda supported by Pˆ in s. Note that Pˆ∪{i} ∈ P(s′i, s−i).
If Pˆ ∪ {i} = argmaxP ′∈P(s′i,s−i)wP ′(s
′
i, s−i), then ui(s
′
i, s−i) > 0, a contra-
diction. If not, then pick any Pˆ ′ ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s′i,s−i) wP ′(s
′
i, s−i). Let aˆ
′
be the agenda supported by Pˆ ′ in (s′i, s−i). Consider the strategy (s
′′
i , s−i)
such that s′′i = aˆ
′. The sets of agendas supported by the parties are the same
in (s′i, s−i) and (s
′′
i , s−i). Hence, Pˆ
′∪{i} ∈ argmaxP ′∈P(s′′i ,s−i)wP ′(s
′′
i , s−i).
Therefore, ui(s′′i , s−i) > 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 10. If s is a Nash equilibrium with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then for any two
adjacent parties P and P ′ in P(s), we have ls(P ) = rs(P ′) and rs(P ) =
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ls(P ′). Furthermore, if |P(s)| is odd, then all parties are equidistant from
each other.
Proof. Let P and P ′ be two adjacent parties in P(s). Without loss of
generality, let P ′ = Ls(P ). Hence, ls(P ) = rs(P ′). By Lemma 9, P and P ′
have equal weights. So rs(P ) = ls(P ′).
Let P 1 = P and P k+1 = Rs(P k) for k = 1, . . . , |P(s)| − 1. Note that
P |P(s)| = P ′. If |P(s)| is odd, then we have rs(P 1) = ls(P 2) = rs(P 3) =
. . . = rs(P |P(s)|), rs(P |P(s)|) = ls(P 1) and ls(P 1) = rs(P 2) = ls(P 3) =
. . . = ls(P |P(s)|). Therefore, all parties are equidistant from each other.
Lemma 11. If s is a Nash equilibrium with |P(s)| ≥ 2, then maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P |
−|P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof. Pick any P,P ′ ∈ P(s). Without loss of generality, let |P | > |P ′|+1.
Consider a politician i ∈ P . We have ui(s) =
wP (s)
|P | . Let s
′
i = a
′, where
a′ is the agenda supported by party P ′ in s. Since the sets of agendas
supported in (s′i, s−i) and s are the same, all parties formed in (s
′
i, s−i)
have equal weights (s is a Nash equilibrium and Lemma 9). Furthermore,
the weight of party P ′∪{i} in the strategy profile (s′i, s−i) is equal to wP ′(s).
Hence, ui(s′i, s−i) =
wP ′ (s)
|P ′|+1 . But wP (s) = wP ′(s), by Lemma 9. Therefore,
ui(s′i, s−i) > ui(s), a contradiction.
Lemma 12. A strategy profile s such that |P(s)| = 2 is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for any P ∈ P(s) and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P |−
|P ′| ≤ 1.
Proof. Let s be a Nash equilibrium such that |P(s)| = 2. Then maxP,P ′∈P(s)
|P |− |P ′| ≤ 1 follows from Lemma 11.
Let P(s) = {P,P ′}. Since |I| ≥ 3, at least one of the parties is not
singleton. Without loss of generality, let |P | > 1. Pick an i ∈ P . Since
wP (s) = wP ′(s) =
1
2 , we have ui(s) ≤
1
4 .
Let d = min{ls(P ), rs(P )}. We call the arc between the agendas sup-
ported by parties P and P ′ in s with length d as arc d, and the other arc
as arc 1− d (in case d = 12 , then call any one of the two arcs defined by the
agendas supported by P and P ′ in s as arc d and the other as arc 1− d).
Suppose d ≤ 13 . Let politician i deviate to s
′
i, which is the midpoint of
arc 1−d. In strategy profile (s′i, s−i), there are three parties {i}, P \{i} and
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P ′. Furthermore, w{i}(s
′
i, s−i) =
1−d
2 ≥
1
3 , wP\{i}(s
′
i, s−i) = wP ′(s
′
i, s−i) =
1+d
4 ≤
1
3 . Hence, ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥
1
3 , a contradiction.
To prove the other implication, suppose s is a strategy profile with
P(s) = {P,P ′}, d > 13 and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P | − |P
′| ≤ 1. Pick any i ∈ P .
We have ui(s) =
1
2|P | . Consider any deviation s
′
i by politician i. Now, two
cases are possible:
(i) |P | > 1: Suppose s′i is an unsupported agenda on arc d. Then three
parties {i}, P\{i} and P ′ form in (s′i, s−i). Moreover, w{i}(s
′
i, s−i) =
d
2
but wP\{i}(s
′
i, s−i) >
1
2 −
d
2 ≥
d
2 since d ≤
1
2 . Hence, ui(s
′
i, s−i) = 0.
Hence, i has no incentive to deviate from si to s′i. Next, suppose
s′i is an unsupported agenda on arc 1 − d. Again, three parties {i},
P \ {i} and P ′ form in (s′i, s−i). Moreover, w{i}(s
′
i, s−i) =
1−d
2 but
either P ′ or P \ {i} has a weight of at least 1+d4 >
1−d
2 since d >
1
3 .
Hence, ui(s′i, s−i) = 0 and i has no incentive to deviate from si to
s′i. Finally, if s
′
i is the agenda supported by party P
′ in s, then
ui(s′i, s−i) =
1
2(|P ′|+1) ≤
1
2|P | since |P |− |P
′| ≤ 1. So i has no incentive
to make this deviation.
(ii) |P | = 1: As long as s′i is not the agenda supported by P
′, ui(s′i, s−i) =
1
2 . If s
′
i is the agenda supported by P
′, then ui(s′i, s−i) =
1
|P ′|+1 ≤
1
3 .
So i has no incentive to deviate.
A similar argument can be made for any politician in party P ′. Hence, s
is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 13. A strategy profile s such that |P(s)| ≥ 3 and |I| ≥ 2|P(s)| is
a Nash equilibrium if and only if all parties in P(s) have equal weights and
maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P |− |P
′| ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose strategy profile s is such that all parties have equal weights
and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P | − |P
′| ≤ 1. Pick any P ∈ P(s) and i ∈ P . Since
wP (s) =
1
|P(s)| , we have ui(s) =
1
|P(s)||P | . Furthermore, since |I| ≥ 2|P(s)|,
we must have |P ′| ≥ 2 for all P ′ ∈ P(s). Consider any deviation s′i by
politician i. If s′i is an agenda supported by some P
′ ∈ P(s), then the sets of
agendas supported by the parties are the same in s and (s′i, s−i). Hence, all
parties formed in (s′i, s−i) have equal weights and wP ′∪{i}(s
′
i, s−i) = wP ′(s).
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Therefore, ui(s′i, s−i) =
1
|P(s)|(|P ′|+1) ≤
1
|P(s)||P | since |P | ≤ |P
′|+ 1. If s′i is
an agenda that is not supported in strategy s, then there exists a P ′ ∈ P(s)
such that s′i is between the agendas supported by P
′ and Ls(P ′) in s. Hence,
w{i}(s
′
i, s−i) =
ls(P ′)
2 . But the weight of party R
(s′i,si)(P ′) in (s′i, s−i) equals
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
2 (using the fact that there are at least three parties in s and
all these parties have equal weights). Hence, ui(s′i, s−i) = 0 and therefore,
there is no incentive for her to deviate. Lemmas 9 and 11 prove the other
implication.
Lemma 14. There does not exist a Nash equilibrium s such that either (i)
|P(s)| = 1 or (ii) |P(s)| > 6 and |I| < 2|P(s)|.
Proof. Suppose s is such a Nash equilibrium. If |P(s)| = 1, then any
politician i can deviate to any s′i and obtain ui(s
′
i, s−i) =
1
2 >
1
|I| = ui(s).
Next, if |P(s)| > 6 and |I| < 2|P(s)|, then there exists at least one party
P ∈ P(s) such that P = {i}. It follows from Lemma 9 that ui(s) = 1|P(s)| .
Let P ′ be the closest party adjacent to P in s. We know that |P ′| ∈ {1, 2}
(Lemma 11). If politician i deviates to s′i, which is the agenda supported
by P ′ in s, then there are at most two parties with the highest weight
in (s′i, s−i) and P
′ ∪ {i} is one of these two parties. Hence, ui(s′i, s−i) ≥
1
2(|P ′|+1) ≥
1
6 >
1
|P(s)| , a contradiction.
Lemma 15. A strategy profile s such that 5 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 6 and |I| < 2|P(s)|
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if all parties are equidistant from each
other, maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P |− |P
′| ≤ 1, and there do not exist P,P ′ ∈ P(s) such
that P and P ′ are adjacent, and |P | = |P ′| = 1.
Proof. Let s be such a Nash equilibrium. First, suppose that the parties
are not equidistant. It follows from Lemma 10 that |P(s)| = 6 and ls(P ′′) ̸=
rs(P ′′) for all P ′′ ∈ P(s). Since |I| < 2|P(s)| there exists a party P ∈ P(s)
such that P = {i}. Hence, ui(s) = 1|P(s)| (Lemma 9). Let P
′ be the closest
party adjacent to P in s. We know that |P ′| ∈ {1, 2} (Lemma 11). If
politician i deviates to s′i, which is the agenda supported by P
′ in s, then
the weight of party P ′ ∪ {i} in (s′i, s−i) is strictly greater than any other
party’s weight and hence, ui(s′i, s−i) ≥
1
3 >
1
6 , a contradiction. Therefore,
all parties in s are equidistant from each other.
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Next, suppose that there are two adjacent parties P,P ′ ∈ P(s) such that
|P | = |P ′| = 1. Let P = {i}. Then ui(s) =
1
|P(s)| (Lemma 9). If politician
i deviates to s′i, which is the agenda supported by P
′ in s, then there are
exactly two parties in (s′i, s−i) with the highest weight and party P
′ ∪ {i}
in (s′i, s−i) is one of them. Hence, ui(s
′
i, s−i) =
1
4 >
1
|P(s)| , a contradiction.
Finally, we show the other implication. Let s satisfy the conditions
listed in the lemma. Pick any P ∈ P(s) and i ∈ P . Then |P | ≤ 2 and
ui(s) =
1
|P(s)||P | . Consider any deviation s
′
i by politician i.
(i) Suppose |P | = 2: If s′i is an agenda supported by some P
′ ∈ P(s),
then the sets of agendas supported by the parties are the same in s and
(s′i, s−i). Hence, wP ′∪{i}(s
′
i, s−i) = wP ′(s) and therefore, ui(s
′
i, s−i) =
1
|P(s)|(|P ′|+1) ≤
1
|P(s)||P | since |P | ≤ |P
′|+ 1. If s′i is an agenda that is
not supported by any party in strategy s, then there exists a P ′ ∈ P(s)
such that s′i is between the agendas supported by P
′ and Ls(P ′) in
s. Hence, w{i}(s
′
i, s−i) =
ls(P ′)
2 . But the weight of party R
(s′i,si)(P ′)
in (s′i, s−i) equals
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
2 (using the fact that there are at least
three parties in s and all these parties have equal weights). Hence,
ui(s′i, s−i) = 0 and therefore, there is no incentive for her to deviate.
(ii) Suppose |P | = 1: Let arc d′ be the arc between the agendas supported
by Ls(P ) and Rs(P ) in s that does not contain si. If s′i is in arc d
′
but s′i is neither the agenda supported by L
s(P ) nor Rs(P ) in s,
then parties Ls(P ) and Rs(P ) are also formed in strategy (s′i, s−i)
and at least one of them obtains a higher weight than the party of
politician i in (s′i, s−i). Hence, ui(s
′
i, s−i) = 0 and therefore, there is
no incentive to deviate. If s′i is the agenda supported by L
s(P ) in s,
then Ls(P ) ∪ {i} and Rs(P ) form in strategy (s′i, s−i) and obtain the
highest weight. Since |Ls(P )| = 2, we have ui(s′i, s−i) =
1
6 . Therefore,
there is no incentive to deviate. A similar argument works if s′i is the
agenda supported by Rs(P ) in s. In the remaining case, ui(s′i, s−i) = 0
since both Ls(P ) andRs(P ) are also formed in strategy (s′i, s−i) and at
least one of them obtains a higher weight than the party of politician
i in (s′i, s−i). Hence, there is no incentive to deviate.
Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium.
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Lemma 16. A strategy profile s such that 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 4 and |I| < 2|P(s)|
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if all parties are equidistant from each
other and maxP,P ′∈P(s) |P |− |P
′| ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 15.
The above lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3: We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 17. Let s be such that |P(s)| ≥ 4. Then s is not a defection-proof
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that s is a defection-proof Nash equilibrium. Let P(s) =
{P 1, . . . , Pn} such that n ≥ 4. Without loss of generality, let P k+1 =
Rs(P k) for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1 and ls(P 3) ≤ rs(P 3). Since s is a Nash
equilibrium, all parties in P(s) have equal weights. Therefore, ui(s) =
1
|P(s)||P k|
for all i ∈ P k. Moreover, |P 2| + |P 3| ≤ 2|P k| + 1 for k = 2, 3
(using Lemma 11).
Consider the arc between the agendas supported by P 2 and P 3 in s
corresponding to ls(P 3). Let a be the midpoint of this arc. Consider
the coalition J = P 2 ∪ P 3 and s′J such that s
′
j = a for all j ∈ J . Let
s′ = (s′J , s−J). Now, P(s
′) = {P 1, P 2 ∪ P 3, P 4, . . . , Pn} and
ls
′
(P 2 ∪ P 3) = ls(P 2) + l
s(P 3)
2 = r
s(P 3) + r
s(P 2)
2 = r
s′(P 2 ∪ P 3).
Thus, the weight of P 2 ∪ P 3 in s′ equals ls(P 2) + l
s(P 3)
2 . Now, r
s′(P 1) =
ls
′
(P 2 ∪ P 3) and ls
′
(P 1) = ls(P 1) = ls(P 3) ≤ rs(P 3) = ls(P 2). Similarly,
ls
′
(P 4) = rs
′
(P 2 ∪P 3) and rs
′
(P 4) ≤ rs(P 3). Therefore, in s′, P 2 ∪P 3 has
a greater weight than both P 1 and P 4. Clearly, wP k(s
′) = wP k(s) for all
k > 4. Therefore, in s′, P 2 ∪ P 3 is the unique party with the maximum
weight. Hence, uj(s′) =
1
|P 2|+|P 3| for all j ∈ J .
Since |P(s)||P k | ≥ 4|P k| > 2|P k|+ 1 ≥ |P 2|+ |P 3| for k = 2, 3, s′J is a
defection from s by J .
Consider any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J and let s′′J ′ be such that s
′′
j = a
′ ̸= a
for all j ∈ J ′′. Let s′′ = (s′′J ′ , s
′
−J ′). If a
′ lies on the arc between the agendas
supported by P 1 and P 4 in s′ that does not contain a, then party J \J ′ will
be the unique party with the maximum weight in s′′. Hence, the utility
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of each j ∈ J ′′ will be zero in s′′. In all other cases, the new party J ′
will obtain a weight of l
s′(P 2∪P 3)
2 , which is less than the weight obtained
by at least either P 1 or P 4 in s′′. Thus, the utility of each j ∈ J ′′ will
again be zero in s′′. So there does not exist any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J with
a defection from s′. Therefore, s′J is a credible defection from s by J , a
contradiction.
Lemma 18. Let s be a Nash equilibrium such that |P(s)| = 3. Then, s is
a defection-proof Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P(s) = {P 1, P 2, P 3}, J a coalition of politicians, and s′J a profile
for this coalition such that sj ̸= s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Suppose s
′
J is a credible
defection from s by J . Consider the following cases:
(i) P k \ J ̸= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Pick any j ∈ J and consider
the strategy profile (s′j , s−j). Clearly the set of agendas supported in
(s′J , s−J) is equal to the set of agendas supported in (s
′
j , s−j). Therefore,
the weight of party supporting a in (s′J , s−J) is equal to the weight of the
party supporting a in (s′j , s−j). But the latter party is singleton. Thus,
uj(s′j , s−j) ≥ uj(s
′
J , s−J) > uj(s), a contradiction to the fact that s is a
Nash equilibrium.
(ii) P 1 ⊆ J and P k \ J ̸= ∅ for k = 2, 3. Then a is not supported by
P 1 in s. If a is also not supported by P 2 or P 3 in s, then three parties
form in (s′J , s−J) but the weight of the party supporting a is less than the
weight of at least one other party. Thus, uj(s′J , s−J) = 0 for all j ∈ J ,
a contradiction. If a is supported by, without loss of generality, P 2, then
P 2 ∩ J = ∅. Now, two parties form in (s′J , s−J). Pick any j ∈ P
1. Then
uj(s′J , s−J) ≤
1
2|P 1|+2|P 2| . On the other hand, uj(s) =
1
3|P 1| . However,
3|P 1| ≤ 2|P 1|+ 2|P 2| because |P 1| ≤ |P 2|+ 1 ≤ 2|P 2|. So s′J cannot be a
defection. Similarly, we can obtain contradictions when either:
(iii) P 2 ⊆ J and P k \ J ̸= ∅ for k = 1, 3, or
(iv) P 3 ⊆ J and P k \ J ̸= ∅ for k = 1, 2.
(v) P 1 ∪ P 2 ⊆ J and P 3 \ J ̸= ∅. Then a is not supported by both
P 1 and P 2 in s. If a is also not supported by P 3 in s, then two parties
form in (s′J , s−J). Pick any j ∈ P
1. Then uj(s′J , s−J) ≤
1
2|P 1|+2|P 2| . On
the other hand, uj(s) =
1
3|P 1| . However, as above, 3|P
1| ≤ 2|P 1| + 2|P 2|.
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So s′J cannot be a defection, a contradiction. If a is supported by P
3, then
P 3 ∩ J = ∅. Now, a single party is formed in (s′J , s−J). However, since
(s′J , s−J) is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a credible defection by a
single politician, without loss of generality by j ∈ J , from (s′J , s−J). Thus,
(s′J , s−J) is not a credible defection from s by J , a contradiction. We can
similarly obtain contradictions when either:
(vi) P 1 ∪ P 3 ⊆ J and P 2 \ J ̸= ∅, or
(vii) P 2 ∪ P 3 ⊆ J and P 1 \ J ̸= ∅.
(viii) P 1 ∪ P 2 ∪ P 3 = J . A single party is formed after the defection
and hence, the resulting profile is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the initial
defection is not credible, a contradiction.
Lemma 19. Let s be a Nash equilibrium such that |P(s)| = 2. Then s is
a defection-proof Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P(s) = {P 1, P 2}, J a coalition of politicians, and s′J a profile
for this coalition such that sj ̸= s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Suppose s
′
J is a
credible defection from s by J . Consider the following cases:
(i) P k \ J ̸= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, 2}. Pick any j ∈ J and consider
the strategy profile (s′j , s−j). Clearly the set of agendas supported in
(s′J , s−J) is equal to the set of agendas supported in (s
′
j , s−j). Therefore,
the weight of party supporting a in (s′J , s−J) is equal to the weight of the
party supporting a in (s′j , s−j). But the latter party is singleton. Thus,
uj(s′j , s−j) ≥ uj(s
′
J , s−J) > uj(s), a contradiction to the fact that s is a
Nash equilibrium.
(ii) P 1 ⊆ J and P 2 \ J ̸= ∅. Then a is not supported by P 1 in s. If a
is also not supported by P 2 in s, then two parties form in (s′J , s−J). The
weight of the party supporting a is equal to 12 . Thus, for any j ∈ P
1, we
have uj(s′J , s−J) ≤
1
2|P 1| = uj(s), a contradiction. If a is supported by P
2,
then P 2∩J = ∅. Now, a single party is formed in (s′J , s−J). However, since
(s′J , s−J) is not a Nash equilibrium, (s
′
J , s−J) is not a credible defection
from s by J , a contradiction. We can similarly obtain a contradiction
when:
(iii) P 2 ⊆ J and P 1 \ J ̸= ∅.
(iv) P 1∪P 2 = J . A single party is formed after the defection and hence,
the resulting profile is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, the initial defection
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is not credible, a contradiction.
These lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem.
Proportional Rule
Proof of Theorem 5: We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 20. Let s be such that there exists a party P in P(s) with |P | ≥ 3.
Then s is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P ∈ P(s) such that |P | ≥ 3. Without loss of generality, suppose
ls(P ) ≥ rs(P ). Pick any politician i ∈ P and consider the strategy profile
(s′i, s−i) such that s
′
i is any agenda on the arc corresponding to l
s(P ) except
the agendas supported by P and Ls(P ) in s. Then ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P )
2 >
ls(P )
|P | ≥
ls(P )+rs(P )
2|P | = ui(s). Therefore, s is not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 21. Let s be a Nash equilibrium. Then for any P ∈ P(s) such
that |P | = 2, we must have ls(P ) = rs(P ) = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Proof. Let P ∈ P(s) such that |P | = 2. Let d∗ = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Suppose d∗ > min{ls(P ), rs(P )}. Note that d∗ ≥ max{ls(P ), rs(P )}.
Therefore, l
s(P )+rs(P )
2 < d
∗. Let P ′′ = argmaxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)} and
without loss of generality, suppose ls(P ′′) ≥ rs(P ′′). Pick any politician
i ∈ P and consider the strategy profile (s′′i , s−i) such that s
′′
i is any agenda
on the arc corresponding to ls(P ′′) except the agendas supported by P ′′
and Ls(P ′′) in s. Then ui(s′′i , s−i) =
ls(P ′′)
2 =
d∗
2 >
ls(P )+rs(P )
4 = ui(s).
Therefore, s is not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 22. Let s be a Nash equilibrium. Then for any P ∈ P(s) such
that |P | = 1, we must have ls(P ) + rs(P ) ≥ maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Proof. Let P ∈ P(s) such that |P | = 1. Suppose ls(P )+rs(P ) < maxP ′∈P(s)
{ls(P ′), rs(P ′)}. Let P ′′ = argmaxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)} and without loss
of generality, suppose ls(P ′′) ≥ rs(P ′′). Pick any politician i ∈ P and con-
sider the strategy profile (s′′i , s−i) such that s
′′
i is any agenda on the arc
corresponding to ls(P ′′) except the agendas supported by P ′′ and Ls(P ′′)
in s. Then ui(s′′i , s−i) =
ls(P ′′)
2 >
ls(P )+rs(P )
2 = ui(s). Therefore, s is not a
Nash equilibrium.
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Lemma 23. Let s be such that for any party P ∈ P(s) either
(i) |P | = 2 and ls(P ) = rs(P ) = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)} or
(ii) |P | = 1 and ls(P ) + rs(P ) ≥ maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Then s is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let s be such a strategy profile and d∗ = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Pick a P ∈ P(s) such that |P | = 2. A politician i in party P gets d
∗
2 .
Consider a deviation s′i. First, suppose s
′
i is not an agenda supported in
s. Clearly, s′i lies between two agendas supported in s. Furthermore, since
|P | = 2, all the agendas that are supported in s are also supported in
(s′i, s−i). Hence, there exists a P
′′ ∈ P(s) such that ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P ′′)
2 ≤
d∗
2 = ui(s). Second, suppose s
′
i is an agenda supported in s by P
′′ such that
|P ′′| = 2. Now, the set of agendas supported in (s′i, s−i) equals the set of
agendas supported in s. Clearly, ui(s′i, s−i) =
d∗
3 < ui(s). Finally, suppose
s′i is an agenda supported in s by P
′′ such that |P ′′| = 1. Again, the set
of agendas supported in (s′i, s−i) equals the set of agendas supported in s.
Moreover, ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P ′′)+rs(P ′′)
4 ≤
d∗
2 = ui(s).
Next, pick a P ∈ P(s) such that |P | = 1. Since ls(P )+ rs(P ) ≥ d∗, the
politician i in party P gets utility of at least d
∗
2 . Consider a deviation s
′
i.
First, suppose s′i is not an agenda supported in s. If s
′
i does not lie on the
arc between the agendas supported by Ls(P ) and Rs(P ) that contains si,
then there exists a P ′′ ∈ P(s) such that ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P ′′)
2 ≤
d∗
2 ≤ ui(s).
On the other hand, if s′i lies on the arc between the agendas supported
by Ls(P ) and Rs(P ) that contains si, then ui(s′i, s−i) = ui(s). Second,
suppose s′i is an agenda supported in s by P
′′ such that |P ′′| = 2. If
P ′′ /∈ {Ls(P ), Rs(P )}, then ui(s′i, s−i) =
d∗
3 <
d∗
2 ≤ ui(s). On the other
hand, if P ′′ = Ls(P ) (a similar argument works when P ′′ = Rs(P )), then
ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P ′′)+ls(P )+rs(P )
6 ≤
d∗
2 ≤ ui(s). Finally, suppose s
′
i is an
agenda supported in s by P ′′ such that |P ′′| = 1. If P ′′ /∈ {Ls(P ), Rs(P )},
then ui(s′i, s−i) ≤
d∗
2 ≤ ui(s). On the other hand, if P
′′ = Ls(P ) (a similar
argument works when P ′′ = Rs(P )), then ui(s′i, s−i) =
ls(P ′′)+ls(P )+rs(P )
4 ≤
d∗+ls(P )+rs(P )
4 ≤
ls(P )+rs(P )
2 = ui(s).
Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium.
These lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 7: Every defection-proof Nash equilibrium is by defi-
nition a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to show that every Nash equilibrium is also a CPNE. Suppose
s is a Nash equilibrium. Let J be a coalition of politicians, and s′J a profile
for this coalition such that sj ̸= s′j = a for all j ∈ J . Suppose s
′
J is a
credible defection
Since s is a Nash equilibrium, we must have |J | ≥ 2. Consider the
profile s′ = (s′J , s−J) and let P ∈ P(s
′) be such that J ⊆ P .
First, suppose |P | ≥ 3. If J consists of all politicians forming a grand
coalition then any deviation by any single player will give her a higher
utility. This contradicts s′ being a credible defection from s by J , hence
|J | < |I| and there will be more than 1 party formed under s′. Without
loss of generality, let ls
′
(P ) ≥ rs
′
(P ). Pick any politician j ∈ J and con-
sider the strategy profile (s′′j , s
′
−j) such that s
′′
j is any agenda on the arc
corresponding to ls
′
(P ) except the agendas supported by P and Ls
′
(P ) in
s′. Then uj(s′′j , s
′
−j) =
ls
′
(P )
2 >
ls
′
(P )
|P | ≥
ls
′
(P )+rs
′
(P )
2|P | = uj(s
′). Therefore,
s′′j is a credible defection from s
′ by j ∈ J ; a contradiction. Thus, it must
be that |P | = |J | = 2. Therefore, a is not supported by any party in s and
hence, a lies between the agendas supported by some P ′ and Ls(P ′) in s.
Consider the following cases:
(i) Suppose P ′\J ̸= ∅ and Ls(P ′)\J ̸= ∅. Pick any j ∈ J . Then uj(s′) =
ls(P ′)
2 . Since s
′
J is a defection from s by J , it must be that uj(s
′) > uj(s).
Consider the strategy profile (s′j, s−j). Clearly, uj(s
′
j , s−j) =
ls(P ′)
2 > uj(s),
a contradiction to the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose P ′ ⊆ J and Ls(P ′) \ J ̸= ∅. If Rs(P ′) \ J ̸= ∅, then for any
j ∈ J ∩P ′ we have uj(s′) =
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
4 ≤ uj(s) (the equality uses the fact
that |J | = 2). On the other hand, if Rs(P ′) ⊆ J , then P ′ ∪ Rs(P ′) ⊆ J
and |J | = 2 implies that P ′ ∪ Rs(P ′) = J . Let P ′′ = Rs(P ′). Since
P ′ ∪ Rs(P ′) = J , both parties Ls(P ′) and Rs(P ′′) form in s′. Moreover,
since s is a Nash equilibrium and |P ′| = 1, we have rs(P ′′) ≤ ls(P ′)+rs(P ′).
Thus, for j ∈ P ′, uj(s′) =
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)+rs(P ′′)
4 ≤
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
2 = uj(s), a
contradiction. We can similarly obtain a contradiction when:
(iii) P ′ \ J ̸= ∅ and Ls(P ′) ⊆ J .
(iv) Suppose P ′ ⊆ J and Ls(P ′) ⊆ J . Let P ′′ = Ls(P ′). Then P ′∪P ′′ =
J since |J | = 2. Moreover both parties Ls(P ′′) and Rs(P ′) form in s′
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(these parties exist since |I| ≥ 3 > |J |). Since s is a Nash equilibrium and
|P ′| = 1, we have ls(P ′′) ≤ ls(P ′) + rs(P ′). Thus, for j ∈ P ′, uj(s′) =
ls(P ′′)+ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
4 ≤
ls(P ′)+rs(P ′)
2 = uj(s), a contradiction.
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Equilibrium Concepts for a
Party Formation Setting
3.1 Introduction
In our first chapter we studied a spatial model of strategic party formation
where the set of available agendas is the unit circle. We investigated how
electoral systems aﬀect the number of parties that form and their perspec-
tive positions with a focus on pluralistic and proportional electoral rules.
The set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this model was very large and
the specific context needed some refinements. We introduced the definition
of Defection-proof Nash equilibria. Using this refinement we found theo-
retical support for famous predictions of electoral outcomes by the French
political scientist Duverger. In this chapter we deal with other selection cri-
teria that are more commonly used in the literature. Our aim is to present
alternative equilibrium notions, characterize the set of equilibria they select
and provide insights into those refinements. We hope this paper will serve
as a useful tool for further research in political party formation. For the
sake of completeness, we start by repeating the model and main findings
of Chapter 2.
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3.2 Model
Our model resembles the Downsian model of electoral competition (Downs
(1957)). However the set of available agendas to politicians is no longer
the unit interval but rather the circumference of a circle of unit length,
denoted by A. Politicians, denoted by I, are purely oﬃce-oriented as they
select agendas independently and simultaneously. The set of politicians
who support the same agenda is called a party. A party can also consist
of only one politician. P(s) denotes the set of all parties formed under the
strategy profile s, where s is a vector that consists of an agenda for each
politician in the elections.
Voters are sincere and non-strategic, each votes for the party located
closest to her most preferred agenda. Their most preferred agendas are
distributed uniformly on the circle.
An electoral system ρ determines the power of a party. Under pluralistic
rule, the winner takes all. Under proportional rule, each party has power
proportional to the number of votes it receives. The utility of an individual
politician is equal to the power of the party she joins divided by the number
of all politicians in that party.
Adding some more definitions will help us with the proofs below. When
a party P is located on the circle, the first party on its left and the first
party on its right are the adjacent parties to P . The distance on the circle
between party P and its adjacent party on the right is called the left distance
of party P and denoted by ls(P ), where s is the strategy profile under which
those parties are formed. The right distance of party P , rs(P ), is defined
similarly. The weight of a party is the proportion of voters who vote for
party P . Please note that the weight of a party is the average of its right
and left distances. The distribution of weights under a strategy profile s
determines the power of a party under each electoral rule.
Policy and welfare implications and post-election politics are ignored in
this model. For a detailed discussion of the model and its assumptions see
Chapter 2.
We begin with the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria under
plurality rule, for the proof see Chapter 2.
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Theorem 24. Under plurality rule, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties in P(s)
diﬀer by at most 1, and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for some P ∈ P(s).
(ii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ |I|2 and all parties have equal weights.
(iii) 3 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 4, |P(s)| > |I|2 and all parties are equidistant from each
other.
(iv) 5 ≤ |P(s)| ≤ 6, |P(s)| > |I|2 , all parties are equidistant from each
other, and there does not exist any pair of singleton parties that are
adjacent.
Secondly, we present the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria under
the proportional rule, see Chapter 2 for the proof.
Theorem 25. Under proportional rule, s is a Nash equilibrium if and only
if for any party P ∈ P(s) either
(i) |P | = 2 and ls(P ) = rs(P ) = maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)} or
(ii) |P | = 1 and ls(P ) + rs(P ) ≥ maxP ′∈P(s){l
s(P ′), rs(P ′)}.
Duverger says that under plurality voting two parties are generated, under
proportional voting there is a tendency to multipartyism and more parties
are generated under proportional system compared to majoritarian sys-
tems (Riker (1982), Morelli (2004)). In both rules, multiple configurations
of parties are possible in Nash equilibrium, some are consistent with the
predictions of Duverger. We find these sets of equilibria too broad and
want to make a further selection.
3.3 Equilibrium Refinements
Strong Nash Equilibrium
A natural alternative to the concept of Nash equilibrium is strong Nash
equilibrium, being widely used in the literature. Nash equilibrium strategies
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are stable against unilateral deviations by a single politician, however it
disregards coordinated deviations by a coalition of politicians. Strong Nash
requires that there is no beneficial deviation by any coalition of politicians
from the equilibrium.
Definition 4 (Strong Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s is a strong
Nash equilibrium if and only if there exists no coalition J ⊆ I such that for
some s′J ∈ A
|J | and i ∈ J we have ui(s′J , s−J) > ui(s) and for all j ∈ J we
have uj(s′J , s−J) ≥ uj(s).
The following two theorems show that selection on basis of strong Nash
leads to the empty set and as such strong Nash appears to be too strong
in the present setting.
Theorem 26. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ and be plurality rule. Then the set of
strong Nash equilibria is empty.
Proof. Consider an electoral competition with at least 3 politicians under
plurality rule. To prove the point that a strong Nash equilibrium does
not exist, let’s start by assuming on the contrary that s is a strong Nash
equilibrium of this strategic party formation game. If s is a strong Nash
equilibrium, then clearly it is also a Nash equilibrium and Theorem 24 tells
us that all parties must have equal weight. Consider the following cases:
Assume s to be a strong Nash-equilibrium with 3 or more parties. Take
any two adjacent parties. If they move away from each other in a symmetric
fashion, then they increase their vote share symmetrically and they become
the only two winning parties. Numbers of politicians in both parties re-
main unchanged, hence each of the politicians in those parties is better oﬀ.
Therefore s cannot be a strong Nash equilibrium.
Let s be a strategy profile which forms 2 parties. There is at least one
party with 2 or more politicians, say party P . Each politician in party P
receives a utility equal to 12|P | . If party P splits into two and those two
new parties move in opposite directions, come close to the other existing
party until it loses all its power. These two new parties share the total
power. All politicians who deviate from s receive strictly more than before,
a contradiction.
Therefore s is not a strong Nash equilibrium. The set of strong Nash
equilibria under plurality rule is empty.
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Theorem 27. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ and be proportional rule. Then the set of
strong Nash equilibria is empty.
Proof. Consider an electoral competition with at least 3 politicians under
proportional rule. To prove the point that a strong Nash equilibrium does
not exist, let’s start by assuming on the contrary that s is a strong Nash
equilibrium of this strategic party formation game.
If there are at least 3 parties formed, then take two arbitrary consecutive
parties P and P ′ in P(s). Consider a coalitional deviation from s by parties
P and P ′ moving further away from each other. Now both parties have a
higher vote share than before, hence more power due to proportional rule.
The number of politicians haven’t changed, therefore all politicians who
deviate from s receive strictly more than before, a contradiction.
If s is a strategy profile which forms only two parties, then at least one
of them consists of more than one politician. If this party splits into two
and each half moves further away from each other, all deviating politicians
receive strictly more than before as we explained above.
Therefore s is not a strong Nash equilibrium. The set of strong Nash
equilibria under plurality rule is empty.
No strong Nash equilibrium exists under plurality or proportional rules,
hence strong Nash is clearly not the refinement we are looking for. We
consider other alternatives.
Party-formation restricted Strong Nash Equilibrium
Some coalitional deviations are quite common in politics and some are not.
We do not observe, for example, a group of politicians deciding together to
form two new parties on very far agendas from each other. On the other
hand, we frequently observe a shift in a party’s agenda, a split in a party
where a subset of politicians form a new party supporting a new agenda or
merger of parties. Those coalitional deviations have one thing in common,
that is each politician in the deviating coalition picks the same agenda. We
restrict the possible deviations in strong Nash equilibrium accordingly and
define Party formation restricted strong Nash equilibrium as follows:
Definition 5 (Party formation restricted strong Nash Equilibrium). A
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strategy profile s is called pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium if and only
if there exists no coalition J ⊆ I such that for some a ∈ A and i ∈ J we have
ui(a, ..., a, s−J ) > ui(s) and for all j ∈ J we have uj(a, ..., a, s−J ) ≥ uj(s).
The following theorems characterize the set of pf-restricted strong Nash
equilibria under plurality and proportional rules.
Theorem 28. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ be plurality rule. A strategy profile s is a
pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium if and only if the number of politicians
in every party diﬀer from each other by at most 1 and precisely one of the
following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2, min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for some P in P(s) and |I| = 2k
for some k ∈ N
(ii) |P(s)| = 3, all parties are equidistant from each other and there is no
k ∈ N such that |I| = 3k + 2.
Proof. We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 29. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ be plurality rule. Let s be a strategy profile
such that |P(s)| ≥ 4. Then s is not pf-restricted strong Nash.
Proof. The same arguments we used in parts i and ii in the proof of The-
orem 26 for strong Nash also applies to pf-restricted strong Nash since all
the politicians in the coalitions are deviating to the same agenda.
Lemma 30. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ be plurality rule. Let s be a strategy profile
which forms three parties. Then s is a pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium and there is no k ∈ N such that
|I| = 3k + 2.
Proof. Let s be a Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 24, we know that all
three parties formed are equidistant from one another and the number of
politicians in every party diﬀer from each other by at most 1. Now there is
no beneficial correlated group deviation such that those three parties remain
but some politicians move to another party. If a group of politicians set
up a new party while those three parties remain, each of those politicians
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receives no utility. If all politicians in a party moves that party to a non-
occupied agenda, they receive no utility at all. Hence, there is no incentive
for such deviations.
It is left to check if any of those parties have an incentive to merge with
another. Let P and P ′ be two arbitrary parties in P(s). A politician i in
party P gets a utility of 13|P | . There are three possible cases:
(i) Let |P | = |P ′|+1. Then |P | ≥ 2. If parties P and P ′ merge, politician
i gets a utility of 14|P |−2 .
(ii) Let |P | = |P ′| − 1. If parties P and P ′ merge, politician i gets a
utility of 14|P |+2 .
(iii) Let |P | = |P ′|. If parties P and P ′ merge, politician i gets a utility
of 14|P | .
In any of the cases above, there is no incentive for merger.
We checked all possible deviations except the merger of three parties. If
parties consist of diﬀerent number of politicians, then a party more crowded
than at least one other, has an incentive to merge with others. If there is
only one party more crowded than the other two, the collusion will not take
place, because one of the small parties will not agree with it. If there are
two crowded parties, they will agree on merging with the third on its agenda
and all deviating politicians will get better oﬀ. Two parties can have at
most 1 diﬀerence between the number of politicians, so this situation with
two crowded, one smaller party only exists when |I| ≡ 2 (mod 3). Hence
we conclude that s is a pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium if and only if
s is a Nash equilibrium and |I| ̸≡ 2 (mod 3).
Lemma 31. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ be plurality rule. Let s be a strategy profile
which forms two parties. Then, s is a pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium
if and only if s is a Nash equilibrium and |I| is even.
Proof. Let s be a Nash equilibrium of only parties P and P ′. Shifting a
party does not alter the utilities. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, if a single
politician forms a new party when the other two parties still exist, that
will not be beneficial for her. Therefore it is not beneficial for a group of
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politicians to do it either. Similarly, a group from one party cannot gain by
switching to the other party. When two parties merge if |I| is even nobody’s
utility is aﬀected. If |I| is odd the larger party gains from merger. So the
larger party moves on the smaller party and all politicians of the larger
party strictly gain from it.
The above lemmas together imply the characterization in the theorem.
Corollary 32. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ be plurality rule. There is a pf-restricted
strong Nash equilibrium if and only if |I| ̸≡ 5 (mod 6).
Proof. Theorem 26 tells us that we can construct a Nash equilibrium by
distributing the politicians to 2 or 3 equidistant agendas in as equal numbers
as possible. Now if |I| ≡ 0 (mod 6), |I| ≡ 2 (mod 6) or |I| ≡ 4 (mod 6)
then |I| is even, we can construct a Nash equilibrium with two parties and
it will be pf-restricted strong Nash according to Lemma 31. If |I| ≡ 1 (mod
6) then |I| ≡ 1 (mod 3) or if |I| ≡ 3 (mod 6) then |I| ≡ 0 (mod 3) and in
these cases we can construct a Nash equilibrium with three parties which
will be pf-restricted strong Nash according to Lemma 30. If |I| ≡ 5 (mod
6) then |I| ≡ 2 (mod 3), we cannot construct any pf-restricted strong Nash
equilibria.
Theorem 33. Let |I| ≥ 3, ρ be proportional rule and s be a strategy profile.
Then s is a pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium if and only if s is a Nash
equilibrium and there exists politicians i and j such that i ̸= j, ui(s) >
1
|I|
and uj(s) >
1
|I| .
Proof. Consider an electoral competition with at least 3 politicians under
proportional rule. Let s be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We will try
to construct a beneficial coalitional deviation to the same agenda a.
If agenda a lies between parties P and P ′ under s, then at least one of
those parties, say P , must have moved to a with the deviation. Otherwise
the politician who gets strictly better oﬀ by this deviation could have devi-
ated by herself to a and got a better payoﬀ, which is not possible because
s is Nash.
Now we know in this deviation all politicians in P must have moved
to a. If a was not occupied by a party under s, then party P simply
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moved to the side. If the neighboring parties still exist, then politicians
in party P do not improve their payoﬀs. And if any more politicians join
the deviation their payoﬀs go down. Therefore in a beneficial coalitional
deviation to agenda a, at least one of the neighbors of party P under s
also joins the deviation. If a was occupied by a party P ′′ before and only
politicians in party P joins this party, then politicians in party P do not
get better oﬀ. Before the deviation, each politician in party P receives
ls(P )+rs(P )
2 and afterwards they receive
ls(P ′′)+ls(P )+rs(P )
2+|P ′′| . |P
′′| is at least
1. ls(P ′′) > ls(P ) + rs(P ) cannot be the case, by Theorem 25 since s is a
Nash equilibrium. So politicians in party P do not get better oﬀ by this
deviation if at least one of its neighbors does not join. If politicians from
parties that are not neighbors join, the politicians in party P that deviated
get worse oﬀ. Therefore in a beneficial coalitional deviation to agenda a,
at least one of the neighbors of party P under s also joins the deviation.
A beneficial coalitional deviation to agenda a, therefore always includes
a chain of consecutive parties merging on a. Then we can always find a
subcoalition of this coalition which consists of only consecutive parties that
can improve upon s by themselves. We do that simply by starting from
where the new party is formed and considering the parties who would have
been neighbors of this new party now if they did not join the deviation.
Afterwards we continue with consecutive parties in s who joined the devia-
tion. This chain improves upon s by itself. So we can restrict our attention
to the deviations in form of a chain or grand coalition, which is the case
where all parties merge together.
Assume that a chain with k parties accumulates at a point on the chain.
Without loss of generality we name those k parties from 1 to k. We denote
ls(P ) by ∆P and rs(P ) by ∆P+1 for any party P in {1, 2, ..., k}. Total
number of politicians in those k parties are denoted by n.
Now assume that those k parties are all singletons. Fix an arbitrary
politician i from 1 to k. In s she receives a utility equal to ∆i+∆i+12 . After
collusion she gets a utility equal to
∑k+1
j=1 ∆j
2k .
For any politician j from 1 to k, we have ∆j ≤ ∆max and ∆k+1 ≤ ∆max
by definition of a maximum and ∆max ≤ ∆i + ∆i+1 by characterization
of Nash equilibria. This gives us ∆k+1 ≤ ∆i +∆i+1 and ∆j ≤ ∆i +∆i+1
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for all j. If we add these inequalities for all politicians in {1, 2, ..., i −
1, i + 2, i + 3, ..., k} and we add ∆i + ∆i+1 to both sides then we obtain∑k+1
j=1 ∆j ≤ k(∆i + ∆i+1). Then we get
∑k+1
j=1 ∆j
2k ≤
∆i+∆i+1
2 . Therefore
politician i cannot be strictly better after this deviation. Since the choice
of politician i was arbitrary, no politician can get strictly better by this
deviation.
If there exists an independent agent, say i which constitutes a party P ,
in the chain she receives ∆P+∆P+12 before merger, and she receives
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆
P˜
2n
after merger. Using the same argumentation as above we obtain
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆
P˜
2k ≤
∆P+∆P+1
2 . If n > k, then
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆
P˜
2n <
∆P+∆P+1
2 holds strictly. Therefore
any politician in a singleton party is strictly worse oﬀ by merger as a chain.
If there are at least two singleton parties in the chain, then this merger
does not take place.
If there is exactly one independent candidate in the chain, say politician
i who constitutes party P , a politician in a party with two politicians in it
receives a utility equal to ∆max2 before the merger and
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆
P˜
2(2k−1) after the
merger. We have
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆P˜ ≤ (k + 1)∆max. And since 2 ≤ k, we know
that k + 1 ≤ 2k − 1. Therefore
∑k+1
P˜=1
∆P˜ ≤ (2k − 1)∆max. As a result∑k+1
P˜=1
∆
P˜
2(2k−1) ≤
∆max
2 . No politician from a party with two politicians can gain
from this merger, so it does not take place.
If all parties have two politicians then each politician gets a utility equal
to ∆max2 before the merger and
(k+1)∆max
4k after the merger. The former is
strictly larger since k > 1. This merger does not take place.
After presenting why a chain merger will not be a beneficial deviation,
we examine the grand coalition. If politicians of only one party, say P
gets worse oﬀ but the rest of the politicians Pareto improves, then this is
a beneficial deviation. All parties except P can switch their strategy to
the position of that party. So s is not a pf-restricted strong Nash equilib-
rium. If politicians from more than one party get worse oﬀ this deviation
cannot take place. Then there is no room for improvement, hence s is a
pf-restricted strong Nash equilibrium.
Please note that the set of pf-restricted strong Nash equilibria under pro-
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portional rule is not empty. k equidistant parties with 2 politicians in each
except for one singleton party is pf-restricted strong Nash.
This refinement already improves upon strong Nash by making a nonempty
selection. For plurality, it selects the party configurations with two or three
parties which is supported by empirical observations, however the exact
number of parties and the existence of an equilibrium depend on the exact
number of politicians and is very responsive to small changes in the number
which is not very realistic.
Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
The next alternative is another established notion in the literature, coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. It allows for multilateral deviations like strong
Nash but also employs self-enforceability. Once a coalition makes a devia-
tion, a subcoalition can make a further deviation. We start by defining a
strictly beneficial deviation and credibility or self-enforceability.
Definition 6 (Strictly beneficial deviation). A strictly beneficial deviation
from a strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I is a strategy profile for
coalition J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such that sj ̸= s′j for all j ∈ J , and uj(s
′
J , s−J) >
uj(sJ , s−J) for all j ∈ J .
Definition 7 (Credible strictly beneficial deviation).
(i) A credible strictly beneficial deviation from a strategy profile s by
a politician j ∈ I is a s′j ∈ A such that s
′
j is a strictly beneficial
deviation from s by politician j.
(ii) A credible strictly beneficial deviation from a strategy profile s by a
coalition J ⊆ I such that |J | > 1 is a strategy profile for coalition
J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such that s′J is a defection from s by coalition J and
there does not exist any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J with a credible strictly
beneficial deviation from (s′J , s−J).
Thus, a credible strictly beneficial deviation by a coalition is such that
no further credible strictly beneficial deviation is possible by any proper
subcoalition.
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Definition 8 (Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium). A coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that there is no credible strictly
beneficial deviation from s by any coalition J ⊆ I.
We kept the standard definition, therefore used a strictly beneficial devia-
tion where all deviating agents must be strictly better oﬀ. It is also possible
to define a stronger version of CPNE where one politician in the coalition
needs to be strictly better oﬀ and the rest needs to be at least as good as
before.
The next theorem shows that selection on basis of CPNE leads to the
empty set under proportional rule.
Theorem 34. Let |I| ≥ 3 and ρ and be proportional rule. Then the set of
CPNE is empty.
Proof. Consider an electoral competition with at least 3 politicians under
proportional rule. Let us denote the maximum distance on the circle be-
tween any two adjacent parties by ∆max.
Consider a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium strategy profile s, then
clearly it is also a Nash equilibrium. Assume that there exists a party
P in P(s) with |P | > 1. Theorem 25 tells us that P is then a party with
two politicians with a distance of∆max to its both neighbors. If these politi-
cians split and move in opposite directions until they come close enough
to the adjacent parties, they can improve their payoﬀs. Now each of them
receives a utility of ∆max2 , if they deviate and have a distance of , for ex-
ample, ∆max4 to their adjacent parties, each of them receives
7∆max
8 . This is
larger than ∆max2 and each of those politicians has an incentive to deviate
further individually, hence this is a credible strictly beneficial deviation, a
contradiction. Therefore s only forms singleton parties.
Now let s be a Nash equilibrium which only forms singleton parties.
Since there are at least 3 politicians, there are at least 3 parties formed.
Consider two adjacent parties moving in opposite directions. They both
strictly improve their payoﬀs, hence a strictly beneficial deviation. Once
this deviation takes place, any of those deviating politicians do not have an
incentive to further deviate unilaterally, hence it is credible.
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For any Nash equilibrium we can construct a credible strictly beneficial
deviation, therefore the set of CPNE under plurality rule is empty.
This equilibrium is very complex and we were not able to characterize the
set of CPNE for pluralistic rule. The refinement for proportional rule is
also too strong.
It is also possible to use a stronger definition of CPNE where a weakly
beneficial deviation, which is a Pareto improvement of payoﬀs for the de-
viating politicians, replaces strictly beneficial deviation. Notice that the
theorem and the proof stay the same even if we use the strong definition of
a CPNE.
Defection-proof Nash equilibrium
As we discussed earlier, not all coalitional deviations are equally likely.
Some politicians forming a coalition and switching all together to a new
common agenda is the most commonly observed coalitional deviation in
politics. Therefore, this time we alter the definition of a coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium in the same way altered strong Nash before, when we
defined pf-restricted strong Nash.
Definition 9 (Defection). A defection from a strategy profile s by a coali-
tion J ⊆ I is a strategy profile for coalition J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such that
sj ̸= s′j = a for all j ∈ J , and uj(s
′
J , s−J) > uj(sJ , s−J) for all j ∈ J .
Clearly, a defection is a strictly beneficial deviation to the same agenda
by a coalition of politicians.
Definition 10 (Credible Defection).
(i) A credible defection from a strategy profile s by a politician j ∈ I is
a s′j ∈ A such that s
′
j is a defection from s by politician j.
(ii) A credible defection from a strategy profile s by a coalition J ⊆ I
such that |J | > 1 is a strategy profile for coalition J , s′J ∈ A
|J |, such
that s′J is a defection from s by coalition J and there does not exist
any subcoalition J ′ ⊂ J with a credible defection from (s′J , s−J).
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Thus, a credible defection by a coalition is such that no further credible
defection is possible by any proper subcoalition.
Definition 11 (Defection-Proof Nash Equilibrium). A defection-proof Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile s such that there is no credible defection
from s by any coalition J ⊆ I.
The following theorems characterize the set of DPNE under plurality and
proportional rule.
Theorem 35. Under plurality rule, a strategy profile s is a defection-proof
Nash equilibrium if and only if the numbers of politicians in any two parties
in P(s) diﬀer by at most 1 and exactly one of the following holds:
(i) |P(s)| = 2 and min{ls(P ), rs(P )} > 13 for some P ∈ P(s).
(ii) |P(s)| = 3 and all parties are equidistant from each other.
Theorem 36. Under proportional rule, s is a defection-proof Nash equi-
librium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
Defection-proof Nash equilibrium prediction supports Duverger’s observa-
tions by showing the tendencies for multipartyism under proportional rule,
implying larger number of parties under plurality rule and that no more
than three parties are generated under plurality rule.
3.4 Summary
In Chapter 2 we created a framework to operate on a circular political
setting to observe the forces evident in strategic party formation. In this
chapter we discuss what kind of equilibrium concept would fit this frame-
work best, produce meaningful and explicit predictions.
Nash equilibrium, our first natural candidate equilibrium concept, for
which only individual deviations are considered, gives us a too broad selec-
tion of outcomes hence lacks the predictive power. Strong Nash equilibrium,
where any group deviation is taken into account, leads us to an empty set
therefore it is not of much use here.
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On the other hand, not all moves are meaningful in a party-formation
setting, thus we leave some out. Coordinated moves of politicians are ex-
pected to be made to the same political agenda.1 Strong Nash equilibrium
is modified taking into account only this type of coalitional deviations and
we came up with party formation-restricted Nash equilibrium. This promis-
ing candidate provided predictions that were overly sensitive to existence of
one more politician or less running for the election, thus we deemed those
predictions not robust.
Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium was another strong candidate control-
ling for further deviations from deviations and recently being influential in
the literature. CPNE under plurality rule predicted no equilibrium and un-
der proportional rule it was complicated to calculate the set of equilibria.
Finally, we combined the advantages of pf-restricted NE and CPNE to
formulate defection -proof Nash equilibrium. This concept deals with de-
viations where deviators switch to the same political agenda and further
deviations from deviations considered. It never predicts nonexistence of
equilibrium, it makes more explicit and robust predictions. We conclude
that in our strategic party formation setting defection-proof Nash equilib-
rium concept is a convenient tool and hopefully will help more researchers
working in this field.
1This assumption was discussed further in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 4
Overcoming Moral Hazard
with Social Networks
4.1 Introduction
Much recent literature regarding labor markets (e.g. Granovetter (1995),
Bandeira et al. (2009), Beaman and Magruder (2012), Dustman et al.
(2011), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)) has focused on the use of social
networks in the workplace and how it aﬀects various employer decisions
such as recruitment and discipline within the firm.1 Recruitment decisions,
in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. Starting with Montgomery
(1991), a theoretical and empirical literature has developed trying to under-
stand why referrals are used for recruitment rather than anonymous hiring.2
Empirically, there is increasing evidence that social networks matter much
1This chapter is based on a paper jointly written by Amrita Dhillon, Ronald Peeters
and Ays¸e Mu¨ge Yu¨ksel, which has been released in CAGE Online Working Paper Series
(number 2014/183).
2Kugler (2003), studying high skill industries in the United States, suggests that
employers, through peer pressure from referrer to the new recruit, gain from a reduction
in monitoring costs. Heath’s (2011) research on garment factories in Bangladesh, finds
that referrals serve as a disciplining device by employers. Dhillon et al. (2013) assume
that social proximity encourages altruistic behavior between workers and referrers and
provide evidence suggestive of using a referral system to avoid moral hazard as well.
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more than previously assumed.3
Social networks and connections thus appear to be vital for recruitment
and the use of strong ties. Leveraging close ties with friends and family
also seems to be a recurring pattern in blue collar jobs (Dhillon et al.
(2013)). Yet empirical literature on the underlying reasons for the use of
social networks in this regard is handicapped by the diﬃculties in separating
the diﬀerent possible reasons for their use. Disentangling various possible
mechanisms for why referrals take place is important because the use of
social networks might create more eﬃcient outcomes or more inequitable
outcomes than a direct hire depending on the exact mechanism underlying
their use – e.g. Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) provide evidence that social
networks were detrimental to corporate governance in a large sample of
French public firms; Fafchamps and Moradi (2010) show that the use of
referrals in the Ghanian army was detrimental to productivity. Whether
these results hold more generally or if there are conditions under which we
may expect networks to lead to some positive outcomes as well can only be
answered by understanding the mechanisms underlying the use of referrals.
In this paper, we scrutinize whether social networks are used by em-
ployers to reduce employee moral hazard using a laboratory experiment.
The advantage of the experiment relative to an empirical field study is that
in the experimental setting we can rule out other explanations for the use
of employee referrals such as the reduction of search costs, adverse selec-
tion and improving the match quality as potential explanations of referrals.
We can also rule out explanations other than social proximity as the exact
mechanism that helps to reduce worker moral hazard and we can control
for referrer incentives directly. Finally, we can quantify the extent to which
social networks matter in this setting. There are several novel features in
our experiment. First, we use the social relationships between participants
as they are in real-life, thereby incorporating a feature that is typical to
field experiments. Our experiment can be considered a hybrid between a
conventional lab experiment and a framed field experiment as it incorpo-
rates field context information with a standard subject pool of students (see
3For example, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) report that 70% of blue collar jobs in
Dadar, Mumbai were found through referral (with a corresponding figure for white collar
jobs of around 44%).
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Harrison and List (2004)). Second, we test not just a part of the mechanism
(whether workers put in more eﬀort when they are socially connected to
referrers) but also whether employers can anticipate this eﬀect.
Our theoretical framework is described below and follows the model
developed in Dhillon et al. (2013). An employer is faced with moral hazard
in the workplace. She has the choice to hire anonymously through the spot
market or delegate the hiring decision to a referrer who is socially connected
to a set of potential workers.4 The advantage of the referrer is that the
referrer and worker have some (directed) altruism towards each other via
their social connection and the closer they are, the higher is the altruism.
Altruism implies that the worker has some utility from exerting eﬀort for
the referrer which increases with the strength of the tie. This is the key
ingredient that allows the employer to induce less opportunistic behavior
by the worker. The closer the relationship between the two, the lower the
chances that the worker will shirk. We use the laboratory experiment to
test whether the key predictions of the model hold. First, the employer
prefers to delegate the hiring decision to a referrer who potentially has
a social connection to the workers. Second, the referrer should appoint
a worker at a smaller social distance with a higher probability. Third,
workers should be willing to work harder when they are socially closer to
referrers. Finally, the mechanism through which the employer is able to
prevent opportunistic behavior by employees is directed altruism on the
part of referrers and workers who are socially connected to them.
The experiment assigns subjects three roles: employer, referrer, or work-
ers. Decision making takes place over two stages. In the first stage, the
employer decides whether to hire a worker via the spot market or to out-
source the hiring to the referrer. When there is a successful outsourcing,
the referrer is delegated the hiring decision. In either case, there is a choice
between two workers who diﬀer in the extent of social proximity to the
referrer. In case the employer decides to hire via the spot market, in the
second stage, one of the two workers will be randomly assigned to her. Each
worker who is chosen (whether by referrer or spot market) is given a fixed
budget of 30 units out of which she chooses how much to return to the
4It is assumed that she cannot choose her own friends, capturing the smaller network
of the employer relative to all the employees in her company.
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relevant player (employer or referrer). This feature of the design captures
moral hazard: the title “worker” suggests that the agent is expected to
return some amount of the money she receives to the employer/referrer but
neither the employer nor the referrer controls this decision. The setting is
common knowledge to the four agents. In particular, the employer is aware
of the workers and referrer being given information on their bilateral social
relationships, but she does not receive this information.
We use two levels of social proximity. The first level of social proximity
measures whether agents are directly connected or not. The second level
of social proximity measures the strength of social ties via the number of
friends the agents have in common (see Appendix 1 for the information that
were provided on the choice screen). For our experiment we use informa-
tion available via Facebook. So, for a referrer–worker pair social proximity
is given by a pair (f, c), where f takes a value of 1 in case the referrer and
worker are friends on Facebook and 0 otherwise and c indicates the number
of friends the referrer and the worker have in common on Facebook. If
social networks are used to reduce moral hazard in the workplace then we
hypothesize that: (1) The possibility that referrers can appoint close friends
makes it tempting for the employers to hire via a referrer rather than via
the spot market; (2) Referrers refer friends more often than non-friends and
they refer the closer friends more often; and (3) Workers return on average
more to referrers than to anonymous employers and return even more to
socially closer referrers compared to any other referrer. Our results support
these predictions unambiguously. In addition, we argue that directed altru-
ism is the underlying mechanism for the worker returning more to friends
and to close friends relative to others. We provide supportive evidence of
the importance of directed altruism when social networks are salient.
This paper is related to the experimental literature on dictator games
and trust games. The average returns by dictators in the literature are
about a third of the pie (Engel (2011)) which is higher than the returns
to the spot market that we observe. In the decision to return money to
the referrer, there are three parties involved, there is only a one shot in-
teraction and there are social networks involved. Our experimental design
is able to pinpoint the two main motivations for giving on the part of
workers as altruism and egalitarianism. Leider et al. (2009) use laboratory
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experiments to separate out various reasons for prosocial giving: baseline
altruism, directed altruism and the prospect of future interaction. They
find that directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to
random strangers. In our paper, comparing giving in the spot market to
giving to a friend with some common friends the figure is 54% which is
reassuring for the external validity of the experiment.
Tausch et al. (2014) lists other experiments investigating the eﬀects
of social distance on giving behavior using dictator games: Charness and
Gneezy (2008) shows an increase in returns when the subjects know the
family name of the recipient, D’Excelle and Riedl (2010) provide evidence
on the negative eﬀect of larger social distance on giving behavior among
female high school students and and Goeree et al. (2010) demonstrates the
same eﬀect with a group of household heads of a village in Nicaragua.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces a simple frame-
work to analyze the question, Section 4.3 discusses the experimental design,
Section 4.4 provides the main results and Section 4.5 concludes with a dis-
cussion of the results.
4.2 Conceptual framework
There are 3 types of players: an employer, a referrer and n workers. There
are two stages. At the beginning of stage 1, the employer chooses how to
hire a worker at a fixed and exogenously given wage w. The worker can
be hired directly through the spot market or through referral. Once the
worker is hired, in stage 2 she makes an eﬀort decision e ∈ [0, e¯]. It costs
the worker e to exert eﬀort but she is paid w regardless of eﬀort. Eﬀort
is not observed at all by anyone other than the worker.5 We will assume
however that the wage is fully enforceable, thus we capture a situation
where worker moral hazard is the main concern. Hiring through the spot
market is completely anonymous and the worker is chosen from among n
5A more plausible scenario would have some observability of eﬀort, and the minimum
level of eﬀort may well be positive since workers cannot shirk too much without being
caught. However, the results would not change qualitatively if we allowed for a positive
level of observable eﬀort.
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possible workers with a probability 1n .
6 If the worker is hired through the
spot market, the employer makes a profit π(e), which is increasing and
concave in e. Alternatively, the employer can choose to delegate the hiring
decision to someone within the firm (the referrer) who can use her social
networks to hire a worker. The parameter ρ captures the social ties between
the referrer and a worker. We will assume that ρ is uniformly distributed
over [0, ρ¯] and that a higher ρ signifies closer social ties between the referrer
and a worker. Worker–referrer pairs are heterogeneous with respect to ρ.
We assume that the referrer and the workers have social preferences that
might be related to social proximity; hence including social proximity is
important in this setting and our parameter ρ captures this. If referral is
used, the firm outsources the hiring decision to the referrer, at an asking
price p. This price p represents the stakes that the referee has in accepting
the delegation. If the referrer is an employee in the firm and she hires a
worker, the employer can hold her responsible for the decision. Ultimately
the referrer stands to lose something if her referred worker puts in low eﬀort
(e.g. the referrer may lose the chance to refer again). In the model, this is
captured by the price. Simultaneously, the referrer makes a bid b for hiring
the worker. If the referrer gains from having a socially connected worker
in the workplace, she is willing to put in a positive bid. The bid captures
the referrers expected benefit from referral. If the bid is higher than the
price then a successful outsourcing takes place at the price p. This simply
says that a referrer is willing to accept the hiring delegation if her gain
(bid) is higher than the cost (price). If the bid is lower than the price the
employer must hire through the spot market with a small cost of delay c > 0.
Subsequent to the outsourcing, the employer forfeits any returns from the
worker’s eﬀort in the next stage. We make this assumption, because the
gains to the employer from using referral is captured already in the price.
The price represents the employer’s profit from using referral vis-a`-vis the
spot market. The referrer makes a choice in her available network and hires
someone at a social distance of ρ, therefore the referrer gets to choose ρ.
The employer does not observe the choice of ρ by the referrer nor does
6We ignore the possibility that the worker and the employer are connected. We
capture a situation where the employer has too many vacancies to fill them with people
she is connected to.
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she know ρ¯, but knows that ρ is uniformly distributed on an interval with
lower bound 0. Similarly, the referrer when making her bid does not know
ρ¯, but knows that ρ is uniformly distributed on an interval with lower bound
0. This is because at this point, she has no information on which of her
connections are available to approach for a job. Assume that ρ¯ ∈ {H,L}
and the corresponding probabilities are qH and 1− qH .
The referrer has non-monetary benefits v(ρ) from choosing a worker who
is connected to her; this captures non-monetary benefits from patronage or
directed altruism towards the worker. We assume v′(ρ) > 0, v′′(ρ) < 0 and
v(0) = 0; so, if the worker is unknown to the agent selecting her, there are
no patronage benefits. We also assume that patronage benefits only accrue
if the choice of worker is not random. We will assume that returns from
eﬀort to the referrer, g(e), are increasing and concave in eﬀort. Thus the
utility function of the referrer is denoted UR(ρ) = v(ρ) + g(e).
The worker’s utility function is, in turn, given by U = w− e+α(0)π(e)
when she is in the spot market and by U = w − e + α(ρ)UR(ρ) when she
is hired by the referrer. α denotes the strength of social preferences. We
assume that α is increasing and convex in ρ and α(0) > 0; the eﬀect of
social proximity on the eﬀort decision is therefore positive and the baseline
altruism is also positive. If a worker is chosen randomly, moreover, we will
assume that her anticipated ρ equals 0; this captures anonymous hiring.
Solving the game by backward induction: Suppose the worker is hired
through the spot market. She chooses e to maximize w− e+α(0)π(e). The
first order conditions are given by 1 = α(0)π′(e). By the concavity of π(e),
e∗∗ denotes the optimal choice of e by the worker in the spot market. Note
that it is independent of ρ.
When referrals are used, then the worker chooses e to maximize U =
w−e+α(ρ)UR(ρ). Substituting for UR we get U = w−e+α(ρ)(v(ρ)+g(e)).
The first order conditions are given by α(ρ)g′(e) = 1. Since g(e) is concave,
there is a unique maximizer to this problem denoted by e∗(ρ). Notice
that ∂e
∗
∂ρ = −
α′(ρ)
[α(ρ)]2g′′(e∗) > 0 since α
′(ρ) > 0 and g′′(e) < 0; so e∗ is
increasing in ρ. The referrer anticipates e∗(ρ) and chooses ρ to maximize
UR(ρ) = g(e∗(ρ))+v(ρ). UR(ρ) is increasing in ρ since both g(·) and v(·) are
concave while e∗(ρ) is increasing. If v(ρ) is suﬃciently concave in ρ, then
the referrer has a unique maximizer ρ∗ subject to the feasibility constraint
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ρ∗ ≤ ρ¯. It is possible that UR is not concave but is convex or linear in ρ.
In the latter two cases, there will always be a corner solution.
Recall that at the time of making the bid, the referrer does not know
ρ¯ but knows it’s distribution, ρ¯ ∈ {H,L}. However we know that there is
a unique maximizer ρ∗ subject to the feasibility constraint ρ∗ ≤ ρ¯. When
the constraint is not binding (ρ∗ ≤ L) then regardless of ρ¯ the referrer’s
expected utility at the time of the bid is simply UR(ρ∗) = g(e∗(ρ∗))+v(ρ∗).
When the constraint is binding for L only (H > ρ∗ > L) then the expected
utility is given by E(UR(ρ∗)) = qHUR(ρ∗) + (1− qH)UR(L). Finally, when
the constraint is binding for both cases (H < ρ∗) then we have E(UR(ρ∗)) =
UR(H). Thus it is only whenH > ρ∗ > L that we have diﬀerent eﬀort levels
being chosen in equilibrium.
Since she only gets the referral if the bid is no less than the price and her
bid does not aﬀect the amount she pays (price), the referrer has a dominant
strategy of setting her bid equal to the expected value of the referral. Thus
her bid must be equal to E(UR(ρ∗)). It follows that the referrer’s bid is
increasing in qH whenever H − L is suﬃciently large and L is small, i.e.
H > ρ∗ > L. On the other hand, if H −L is small and L is large, then the
referrer’s bid does not change with qH .
The employer is willing to outsource for any price that satisfies p ≥
π(e∗∗). Her optimal price is p∗ = E(UR(ρ∗)). A lower price would still
suﬃce to guarantee that trade takes place, but does not maximize her
returns from the price, while a higher price leads to no trade. Whenever
the probability qH increases, both employers and referrers anticipate that
returns will be higher whenever the diﬀerence H − L is suﬃciently large
and the size of L is small, and both the equilibrium bid and the price are
higher in this case.
In order to compare e∗ and e∗∗, assume that g(e) = π(e), since there
is no reason to expect that eﬀort chosen by the worker in one case is more
or less eﬃcacious than the other. Then it is easy to see that e∗ > e∗∗.
To summarize, our discussion shows that (1) When H − L is suﬃciently
large and L is not too high then the bid and the price increase as qH
increases or as the likelihood of having a close friend available increases.
This prediction implies that the employer, who does not have the choice to
hire friends, would prefer to delegate the decision to the referrer who does
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have the choice of hiring friends as she can extract a price greater than the
expected returns from the spot market. (2) e∗(ρ) is increasing in ρ; and (3)
e∗ > e∗∗.
These predictions of the solution are the basis for the hypotheses stated
earlier in the introduction: (1) Employers prefer to hire via a referrer rather
than via the spot market; (2) Referrers refer friends more often than non-
friends and they refer the closer friends more often (both because of pa-
tronage benefits and because they anticipate higher eﬀort from friends); (3)
Workers return on average more to referrers than to anonymous employers,
they return even more to socially closer referrers compared to any other
referrer. In addition, we argue that directed altruism is the underlying
mechanism for the worker returning more to friends and to close friends
relative to others.
4.3 The experiment
We conducted our referral-recruitment experiment in a laboratory using the
social relationships between participants as they are in “real-life”, thereby
incorporating a feature that is typical to field experiments. The experimen-
tal design follows the model closely.
Design
In our setting, as in the model, there is an employer, a referrer and two
workers. Decision making takes place over two stages and the decisions
made determine how a fixed surplus of 30 units is divided among the four
agents. We interpret the 30 units as the fixed wages discussed in the model.
In the first stage, the employer decides whether to hire a worker via
the spot market or to outsource the hiring to the referrer. In case of the
latter, she is asked to set the price to be paid to her by the referrer in
case of a successful outsourcing. Simultaneously to the employer’s decision
making, the referrer has to announce the maximum price she is willing to
pay to take over the task to hire a worker. In case the price charged by the
employer does not exceed the maximum price the referrer is willing to pay,
there is a successful outsourcing and the referrer is given the hiring task
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for the price charged; otherwise, the employer and referrer disagree on the
price, and the employer is sent to the spot market.
In case the employer decides to hire via the spot market or has failed
in her attempt to outsource the hiring task, in the second stage, one of the
two workers will be assigned to her randomly. Without knowing whether
they are assigned the job or not, both workers have to indicate how much
of the 30 units they return to the employer if they are assigned the job.7 In
this case, the payment to the employer equals the return of the worker who
is assigned the job (minus 0.5 in case of a failure to outsource), the worker
who is assigned the job receives 30 minus her return, the other worker and
the referrer both receive nothing.8
In case of a successful outsourcing, in the second stage, the referrer has
to choose which of the two workers to hire. Simultaneously, both workers
have to indicate how much of the 30 units they return to the referrer if they
are assigned the job. As the referrer has no information on the returns of the
workers, she cannot condition her choice among them on such information.
The only distinguishing information about the worker that the referrer has,
is about her social proximity to each of the workers. Moreover, she knows
that the workers know their social proximity to her, while deciding how
much to return conditional on being hired. Workers do not have information
on the social distance between the other worker and the referrer. In this
case, the payment to the employer equals the price, the payment to the
referrer equals the return by the hired worker minus the price to be paid to
the employee, the hired worker receives 30 minus her return, and the other
worker receives nothing.
We use two levels of social proximity. The first level of social prox-
imity regards agents being directly connected or not. The second level of
social proximity regards the number of friends agents have in common. For
our experiment we use the information available via Facebook. So, for a
referrer–worker pair social proximity is given by a pair (f, c), where f takes
a value of 1 in case the referrer and worker are friends on Facebook and
7This small change helps us to increase the number of observations without deviating
from the spirit of the model as each worker has a probability of being chosen for the job.
8The small penalty of 0.5 for the employer in case of a failure to outsource is introduced
to make charging a reasonable price when trying to outsource incentive-compatible.
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0 otherwise and c indicates the number of friends the referrer and worker
have in common on Facebook.9 Notice that this distance is symmetric.
The setting is common knowledge to the four agents. In particular, the
employer is aware of the workers and referrer being given information on
their bilateral social relationships, but she does not receive this information
nor does she ever learn about it later. As in the theory, the employer only
has a prior on the level of friendships in the pool. Employers also never
learn how much is returned to the referrer by the workers.
Procedures
For each experimental session in the lab we created two listings in Orsee
(Greiner (2004)). For one of the listings three-fourth of the participants
signed up; for the other the remaining one-fourth. The participants in the
larger group were playing the roles of employer and workers; those in the
smaller group that of referrer. The two groups were kept physically sepa-
rated throughout the entire experimental session, such that referrers never
saw whom they could be interacting with or could have been interacting
with during the session. So, despite information on real-life social relations
being provided throughout the session, we maintained the highest degree
of anonymity possible.
Prior to a session, all participants in this session were asked (via email)
to accept a link that would allow us (the experimenters) to retrieve in-
formation on their social relations on Facebook. Consent to share this
information was a precondition to enroll in the experiment. The only in-
formation we gathered regarded the bilateral connection between any two
participants in the session as summarized by their direct relation (first level
of social proximity) and the number of common friends (second level of so-
cial proximity).
In total we ran six experimental sessions. All sessions took place in
9Our social proximity measure is two-dimensional, however modeling ρ in one dimen-
sion saves complication and unnecessary assumptions while it still captures that diﬀerent
social proximity levels are comparable. We do not wish to find an exact mapping between
the two, but rather make straightforward comparisons such as being a friend is closer
than not being a friend for the same or unknown number of common friends, and when
you are not a friend having more friends in common is strengthening the social ties.
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December 2012 in the BEElab, the experimental laboratory of Maastricht
University. Instructions and comprehension questions were paper-based
(see Appendix 1); the decision stage was computerized using zTree (Fis-
chbacher (2007)). Four sessions were run with 24 participants; the other
two sessions we had to run with 20 participants due to a low show-up. So,
in total 136 students participated.
One-fourth of the participants in a session was assigned the role of em-
ployer, one-fourth that of referrer, and the remaining half were given the
role of workers. These roles were kept fixed throughout the entire exper-
imental session. The participants interacted in a sequence of 30 rounds,
where every round anew they were regrouped with three other partici-
pants, such that each group consisted of one employer, one referrer and
two workers. So, six groups were formed every round in four sessions and
five groups in the other two sessions. In the first 15 rounds only first level
social proximity information was given to the referrer–worker pairs; in the
second 15 rounds first and second level social proximity information was
given. After each round of play, participants received feedback on decisions
as long as they were payoﬀ-relevant. This means that employers received
information on whether a deal was made (i.e., whether the bid was below
the price) and knew the return from the selected worker in case hiring oc-
curred via the spot market, referrers received information on whether a deal
was made, in case a deal was made they learned the price and the return
of the worker whom they selected, and workers only learned whether they
were selected or not.
Payments accumulated over all rounds and were handed out immedi-
ately after the session. For each unit of payoﬀ in the experiment, partic-
ipants received 0.04 Euros. In addition, they received a show-up fee of
3 Euros, and an initial endowment of 3 Euros in experimental currency
units to avoid any bankruptcy (for the referrers).
4.4 Results
This section consists of four subsections. After having provided descriptive
information on the friendship relations among the participants, we deal
consecutively with the three types of decisions in the experiment. First we
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deal with the outsourcing decisions by the employers, where we investigate
if employers prefer the spot market or to outsource the hiring decision
to a referrer, how often a deal is made and how bids and prices change
over time. Thereafter, we consider the hiring decisions referrers make, and
how (relative) social proximity to the workers aﬀects these. Finally, we
investigate the returns by the workers and how these depend on whether
being hired via the spot market or via the referrer and, in case of the latter,
on the social distance to the referrer.
Descriptives
Our aim in the experiment is to examine the eﬀect of friendship on referrer
decisions and worker returns while avoiding establishing such relationships
superficially in the lab and use real-life relations instead. In order to obtain
many friendship relations of diﬀerent levels while keeping the anonymity,
we restricted the subject profile to undergraduate students at the School
of Business and Economics.
Table 4.1 summarizes the social proximity between participants prior to
the role division. Among the 1,484 possible diﬀerent pairs, 46 direct friend-
ship relations existed.10 In 680 possible pairs the two respective participants
had at least one friend in common. The average number of common friends
over all possible pairs is 1.71, and this number is 4.18 when averaging over
the pairs with at least one common friend.
c > 0 c = 0
f = 1 45 (3.03%) 1 (0.07%)
f = 0 635 (42.79%) 803 (54.11%)
Table 4.1: Friendship relations among all possible pairs of participants prior to
the role division.
Table 4.2 summarizes the same information for all possible referrer–
worker pairs after the roles had been decided. After the role division, there
were 388 diﬀerent possible referrer–worker pairs; among those there are
10These unbalanced numbers are due to the use of real-life relations data obtained
through Facebook that were not subject to experimental manipulations.
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10 direct friendship relations. 186 possible referrer–worker pairs had at
least one friend in common. The average number of common friends over
all possible referrer–worker pairs is 2.14, and this number is 4.47 when
restricting attention to the pairs with positive number of common friends.
c > 0 c = 0
f = 1 10 (2.58%) 0 (0.00%)
f = 0 176 (45.36%) 202 (52.06%)
Table 4.2: Friendship relations among all possible referrer–worker pairs.
Referrers only make hiring decisions in rounds where a deal between
the employer and the referrer has been established. It is only in these cases
that the friendship relation of the referrer with the two workers matters.
Out of the 68 participants who were assigned the role of a worker, only 9 of
them ever matched, in a successful outsourcing, with a referrer with whom
she shares a direct friendship relation. Such a matching, in a successful
outsourcing, between a worker and a referrer who is her friend occurred in
total 31 times over all 30 rounds.
Outsourcing by employers
Employers have two options to choose from, either to hire from the spot
market directly or to outsource the hiring to a referrer. If employers expect
workers to return more to the referrer, then they may opt for outsourcing
to exploit this diﬀerence. This comes only at a slight risk due to the small
amount employer needs to pay if her oﬀer is declined. We find that, despite
the small cost in case of a failure to set a deal, employers prefer to hire via
the referrer rather than via the spot market. Over 30 rounds 34 employers
made in total 1,020 hiring decisions, and in 831 of them (81%) a deal is
oﬀered to a referrer.11 This preference to outsource is rather robust over
time.12
11Percentages by which employers opted for outsourcing averaged by session are 90,
75, 89, 76, 85 and 75.
12Over the six consecutive bundles of five rounds, all sessions combined, the respective
percentages by which employers opted for outsourcing are 73, 87, 77, 82, 85 and 85.
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In case the employer makes the attempt to outsource the hiring by
oﬀering a deal to the referrer, whether a deal is reached depends on the
referrer’s bid (which is her revealed maximum price that she is willing to pay
to take over the responsibility to hire). Out of the 1,020 hiring decisions, 397
(39%) resulted in a deal between the employer and the referrer. Figure 4.1
shows the percentage of successful outsourcings with respect to all hiring
decisions for each session. In order to better picture a possible time-trend,
the graph presents moving averages over clusters of 10 rounds.
Figure 4.1: Moving averages over clusters of 10 rounds of the percentage of
successful outsourcings per session.
The figure suggests that heterogeneity across sessions grows over time.
Before the first vertical line, the graph is based only on the first fifteen
rounds where subjects have no information about the second level of social
proximity. After the second vertical line, it is only based on the last fifteen
rounds, where referrers and workers receive information also on the second
level of social proximity. Between the two lines, the data is based on a
mixture of these two informational variations.
Between the first and the second fifteen rounds, where subjects do not
know and do know about the number of common friends respectively, there
is no significant diﬀerence between gross percentage of deals (p = 0.2489;
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on session averages). When allowing
for a learning eﬀect and considering only the last five rounds under the
two diﬀerent information conditions, we find a significant increase in the
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number of deals (p = 0.0345).
Whether a deal is established depends on the prices and the bids. Fig-
ure 4.2 shows the prices and bids by rounds averaged over sessions.13 The
average price is based on the instances where employers decide to outsource
the hiring; so, given that employers try to outsource in 81% of the time, the
average price in each round is based on 28 employer decisions on average.
As referrers do not know about the employers’ intention to outsource at
the moment of setting their bids, the average bid in each round is based on
34 referrer decisions. We see that both bids and prices are declining over
time and follow each other closely.
Figure 4.2: Average referrer bids and employer prices over time.
Referrers are expected to adjust their bids to the returns they receive
from the workers. In case the returns are below the bid such an adjustment
prevents potential losses; in case returns are above it such an adjustment
increases the opportunity to make a profit. Figure 4.3 shows the trend of
bids and returns to the referrer. The graph suggests that the (relatively) low
returns to the referrers drive down the bids referrers make. Still, referrers
bid above the returns from the workers in almost all rounds, suggesting
that there are positive non-monetary benefits to hiring friends.
Employers, on the other hand, are expected to adjust their prices to
13Graphs of the individual sessions do not look much diﬀerent.
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Figure 4.3: Average referrer bids and worker returns to referrers over time.
the bids from referrers and returns they receive from the spot market.
Figure 4.4 shows the trend of prices and returns from the spot market
to the employer. Although employers keep prices far above spot market
returns, both quantities show a decreasing trend. Overall, prices seem to
be more responsive to bids (recall Figure 4.2) than to spot market returns.
The high prices charged lead us to think that employers do not choose to
outsource in order to involve referrers in the sharing of the surplus, but
mainly for the sake of self-interest.14
Hiring by referrer
When there is a successful outsourcing, a referrer is randomly matched with
two workers, either of whom may be a friend or not. Before deciding whom
of the two workers to hire, the referrer receives information on her social
proximity to each of them. If this choice is between a friend and a non-
friend, we find that referrers choose more often for the friend: 7 referrers
were together 29 times in the position to choose between a friend and a non-
friend and 22 times they decided to hire the friend (this is significant at
14Note here that all employers in our data set have experienced at least one spot market
return in the first five rounds and 32 out of the 34 employers even experienced two or
more spot market returns throughout the first five rounds.
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Figure 4.4: Average employer prices and worker returns to employer via spot
market over time.
p = 0.0208; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on individual percentages;
note here that diﬀerent referrers in the same session never directly interact,
hence we believe we can safely regard their decisions as independent).
It is not only the direct friendship relation, but also the number of
common friends that plays a role in the hiring decision of the referrer. We
find that when a worker has more friends in common with the referrer, she
is more likely to be chosen. In the last fifteen rounds, where referrers have
information on both levels of social proximity, referrers hire the worker with
the higher number of common friends in 72.79 percent of the 136 occasions
(This is significant at p = 0.0277 for the test based on session percentages).
Restricting attention to those 119 cases where the referrer is matched with
two non-friend workers, this percentage is 73.11 (p = 0.0277). If this choice
is between a non-friend worker with zero common friends and a non-friend
with a positive number of common friends, this percentage is 73.86 in the
88 cases (p = 0.0269); when both non-friend workers share at least one
common friend, this percentage is 70.97% in the 31 cases (p = 0.0796).
We randomly label one of the two workers as worker 1. Table 4.3
presents the results of a regression with the probability that worker 1 is
selected as dependent variable and the main explanatory variable is how
many more friends she has in common with the referrer compared to the
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ci > 0 c1 > 0
and and
All data cj = 0 c2 > 0
(1) (2) (3)
c1 − c2 0.02
∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Round 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant 0.40∗ 0.21 0.13
(0.20) (0.25) (0.51)
Observations 194 88 44
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.05
Table 4.3: Probability that worker 1 is selected. Both workers are not friends of
the referrer. c1 and c2 stand for the number of friends the referrer has in common
with worker 1 and worker 2 respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered on
individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
other worker.15 As information on the number of common friend is only
given in the last fifteen rounds, only these rounds are considered in the
regression. The table presents the result for three diﬀerent selections of the
data: (1) when both workers are non-friends (i.e. neither of the workers is
friends with the referrer), (2) when both workers are non-friends and one of
them shares a positive number of common friends while the other one does
not have any friend in common, and (3) when both workers are non-friends
and both have at least one friend in common with the referrer.
The results in the table indicate that referrers generally prefer to hire
the worker who has more friends in common with her, which supports the
earlier findings on basis of the nonparametric tests. If both workers have at
least one friend in common with the referrer, this result is not significant,
unlike in the earlier nonparametric tests. This is likely to be due to the
limited number of observations in which a referrer is matched with two
15In this regression, we avoid comparing two levels of social proximity if both dimen-
sions are unequal, since such a comparison needs further information about how people
compare these levels. Therefore we chose to run the regressions for friends and non-
friends separately, not in interaction. Due to limited number of friends data, only the
regression for non-friends is presented.
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workers who are both non-friends and share an unequal positive number of
common friends with her.
Returns by workers
Table 4.4 provides the average returns by workers to referrers and in the
spot market for each sessions. We see that the overall average return to
a referrer is significantly higher than the average return in spot market
(p = 0.0747; Wilcoxon signed-rank on session level). Possible explanations
for this diﬀerence include reciprocity, egalitarian taste, or social proximity.
A detailed description and discussion of these motives is provided in the
final section.
To referrer To spot market
Session 1–30 1–15 16–30 1–30 1–15 16–30
1 7.10 7.02 7.15 4.20 4.84 3.35
2 10.02 9.55 10.43 7.39 7.22 7.58
3 5.18 5.79 4.65 5.93 6.18 5.65
4 8.58 9.17 8.04 7.59 7.86 7.30
5 8.50 8.41 8.57 4.46 5.12 3.52
6 4.40 4.33 4.54 4.14 4.28 4.02
All 7.48 7.41 7.55 5.65 5.94 5.34
Table 4.4: Average returns by workers in the diﬀerent informational conditions
over diﬀerent clusters of rounds.
In order to be able to disentangle the importance of social proximity,
we categorize the possible relationship situations between a worker and a
referrer into five diﬀerent type-classes, based on first and second levels of
social proximity. Type (f = 1, c > 0) refers to workers who are matched
with a referrer that she has a friendship relation with and with whom she
has a positive number of friends in common. As there were no worker–
referrer pairs who had a friendship relation but no common friends in our
experiment, the class of Type (f = 1, c = 0) workers is empty. Type (f =
0, c > 0) refers to workers who are matched with a referrer that she has
no friendship relation with, but does have a positive number of friends in
common. Finally, Type (f = 0, c = 0) refers to workers who have maximal
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social distance in the pool of participants captured in our data. These four
types are only relevant once a successful outsourcing of the hiring process
is reached. Moreover, full type information is revealed to relevant parties
only in the last fifteen rounds; in the first fifteen rounds the first two type-
classes and the latter two are not distinguishable. The last type is the
spot market, which refers to a worker who is not matched with a referrer
but hired by the employer via the spot market. Table 4.5 summarizes the
average returns of the diﬀerent types when all workers have full information
about their type (last fifteen rounds), with, in parentheses, the standard
deviation and number of observations.16
c > 0 c = 0
f = 1 8.24 (7.31, 17) – (–, 0)
f = 0 9.33 (6.73, 184) 6.00 (6.36, 221)
Spot market
5.34 (5.67, 598)
Table 4.5: Average returns by workers in the diﬀerent informational conditions.
Table 4.6 present the result of an OLS and Tobit regression of the re-
turns from the workers in the last fifteen rounds on the types just described
relative to the omitted spot market type. The regression results indicate
that workers do not return significantly more to a non-friend referrer with-
out common friends than they return in the spot market; as such these
referrers are considered total strangers and treated as such. Unlike for
workers of type (f = 1, c > 0), this lack of significance is not due to a poor
number of observations (see Table 4.5). However, when the referrer is not a
total stranger to the worker, as expressed by a nonzero number of common
friends, the worker returns a significantly higher amount than in the spot
market.
Further, the diﬀerence between types (f = 0, c > 0) and (f = 0, c = 0) is
significant (p = 0.0023). We argue that social proximity is the main driver
for this diﬀerence. If the main driver of positive returns by the worker was
16To compare these returns to reciprocal behavior in related famous game situations:
the average return in trust games is usually about 37% of the investment (Johnson and
Mislin (2011)) which would suggest a return of 11.1 at the spot market and the average
return in dictator games is about 28% of the endowment (Engel (2011)) which corresponds
to a return of 8.49 at the spot market.
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OLS Tobit
Type (f = 1, c > 0) 2.99 2.56
(3.02) (4.24)
Type (f = 0, c > 0) 4.00∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗
(0.95) (1.16)
Type (f = 0, c = 0) 0.66 0.55
(0.85) (1.16)
Round −0.07∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Constant 6.93∗∗∗ 6.11∗∗∗
(0.93) (1.19)
Observations 1,020 1,020
R-squared 0.06
Table 4.6: Returns by the various types of workers. Robust standard errors
(clustered on individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
purely returning a favor regardless of the social ties, then one would expect
also a higher return by a worker of type (f = 0, c = 0) since the favor is
the same. Likewise, if the main driver of positive returns was egalitarian
preferences, a higher return would be expected for type (f = 0, c = 0) as
well, just because of the awareness that the surplus is divided among three,
rather than two, individuals.
Table 4.7 presents the results of the regressions that aim to unravel
how the eﬀect of friendship on returns interacts with the number of com-
mon friends. We see from the regressions over the data of the first fifteen
rounds, that workers return more to a non-friend referrer than they return
in the spot market. Notice here that in these first fifteen rounds no infor-
mation is given on the number of friends workers have in common with the
referrer and, hence, they cannot assess perfectly their social proximity to
the referrer.
There is no significant diﬀerence in returns to friend and non-friend
referrers (p = 0.9421 in OLS; p = 0.9197 in Tobit). Like earlier, this lack
of significance may be attributed to the low number of direct friendship
relations among worker–referrer pairs. In total there are only nine workers
who are ever matched with a referrer who is a friend. If we only consider
the average return by these nine workers to referrers who are friends and
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Rounds 1–15 Rounds 16–30
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Type (f = 1, •) 1.60 1.41 10.50∗∗∗ 14.57∗∗∗
(2.52) (3.20) (3.19) (4.50)
Type (f = 0, •) 1.42∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 1.82∗
(0.54) (0.63) (0.77) (0.99)
Type (f = 1, •) × c −0.23∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.11)
Type (f = 0, •) × c 0.38∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13)
Round −0.11∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 6.85∗∗∗ 6.18∗∗∗ 6.78∗∗∗ 5.87∗∗∗
(0.66) (0.84) (0.92) (1.18)
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020
R-squared 0.02 0.06
Table 4.7: Relation of returns to the number of common friends. Robust standard
errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1.
referrers who are non-friends, we still do not find any significant diﬀerence
between returns to friends in non-friends by means of a nonparametric test
(p = 0.2123).17
In the regressions over the last fifteen rounds we see that the return
to non-friends is increasing in the number of common friends, while to
friends the returns are decreasing in this number. The numbers in the
table indicate that up to about fifteen common friends more is returned to
a friend and beyond this number more is returned to a non-friend. Though,
the negative impact of the number of common friend on returns to friends
should be taken with some reservation. During the last fifteen rounds, only
seven workers have been matched with a referrer who is a friend (in 17
decision situations). Those seven individuals mostly adopt a fixed return
to friends and none of them was ever matched with at least two diﬀerent
17Notice that there is no direct interaction between workers nor they learn about each
other’s payoﬀs or relations to the referrers, hence we can safely treat their returns as
independent.
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referrers that are friends and with whom a diﬀerent number of common
friends is shared. A decent within-subject analysis is therefore not possible.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this section we discuss the main findings and the motives behind the
behavior of the participants. Firstly, we are interested in understanding
why workers return anything at all when they are in a position to keep the
full surplus to themselves. Possible explanations are reciprocity, egalitarian
preferences, baseline altruism, directed altruism, or motivation by future
prospects.
A reciprocal individual responds to actions she perceives to be kind in a
kind manner and to actions she perceives to be hostile in a hostile manner.
When a referrer hires a worker, this may be perceived by the worker as
a kind gesture as the referrer actively chooses one worker over the other
while risking a loss by placing a bid. The worker may want to return this
favor. Instead, in the spot market, the employer does not risk a loss and
the worker is not selected by decision; reciprocity should not prevail in this
information state.
Egalitarian preferences of workers is another possible explanation. An
egalitarian individual attempts to produce equality even at a cost to herself
(Dawes et al. (2007)). A perfectly egalitarian individual will return 15 in
the spot market (the endowment is only shared between the worker and
the employer), and return 20 if she is hired by a referrer (the endowment is
shared between the worker, the referrer and the employer). Even if we do
not observe this perfectly egalitarian behavior, some workers may simply
return more to the referrer to be relatively more equal.
Leider et al. (2009) mention three more possible motives. First, base-
line altruism, which entails being nice unconditionally (even to strangers).
Although the presence of this factor cannot be rejected, it cannot explain
the diﬀerences in workers’ returns across the diﬀerent informational condi-
tions. Second, directed altruism, which entails being nicer to socially closer
people. According to this notion diﬀerent types should return diﬀerently
and returns should be responsive to the number of common friends. Third,
motivation by future prospects. Since decisions take place in anonymity,
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workers are rematched to referrers every round anew or hiring may take
place via the spot market, there is no scope for building a reputation rela-
tionships during the session and this factor appears irrelevant.
Hence, only three of the five factors have potential to be of explana-
tory value for behavior observed throughout our experiment: reciprocity,
egalitarianism and directed altruism.
Average returns to referrers are found to be higher than average returns
in the spot market. If this diﬀerence were to be attributed to purely re-
ciprocating a favor or egalitarianism, then we should also see a diﬀerence
between average returns to non-friend referrers with zero common friends
and average returns in the spot market. However, we did not find such a
diﬀerence (and this is not due to a lack of observations). This supports the
earlier claim that social proximity is the main driving force behind observed
diﬀerences.
However, in the first fifteen rounds (when workers do not know their
exact social proximity to the referrer), workers return more to a non-friend
referrer than they return in the spot market. This can be explained by
reciprocity and egalitarian preferences. It appears that in the absence of
exact social proximity information, workers base their decisions on one of
these other factors.
Additional support of the role of social proximity is found in the hiring
decisions by the referrers as well as the outsourcing decision of employers.
Employers prefer to outsource in the vast majority of cases, possibly antic-
ipating higher returns from workers when they are socially more connected
to the referrer relative to herself, although this anticipation can also occur
due to reciprocity or egalitarian concerns. Referrers tend to hire friends
over non-friends, and tend to hire workers with more common friends when
neither of them is a direct friend. Moreover, workers return significantly
more when they have more friends in common with a non-friend referrer.
In conclusion, social ties generally induce higher returns and hiring
decisions on basis of social ties lead to a selection of the more returning
worker. The decisions to outsource and to exploit the social ties of referrers
to workers by the employers therefore leads to an increase in the joint payoﬀ
of the employer and the referrer and justifies the use of job referrals.
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Chapter 5
Workplace Referrals and
Gift Exchange
5.1 Introduction
The notion that firms can exploit the social preferences of their employees
to increase profits is not new.1 Akerlof (1982) theoretically shows that it
is useful for a firm to give “gifts” to employees which increase goodwill
towards the firm and enhance worker productivity. Extensive experimental
literature has provided rich insights into worker-firm relations (see e.g. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993), a survey by Casoria and Riedl (2013) and
another survey by Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009)).
When the hiring decision is outsourced to a referrer, the referrer acts
as an intermediary between the employer and the worker. In the previous
chapter we showed that the decision to outsource recruitment to the refer-
rer is thus based on exploiting an asymmetric social relationship. In this
chapter, we are particularly interested in a diﬀerent form of asymmetry:
even when the worker and the referrer are unconnected socially, it may
still be worthwhile for the employer to outsource the recruitment (or work
allocation) decision to a referrer who can be identified as the person who
personally oﬀers the job to a specific worker, rather than the worker being
1This chapter is based on a paper jointly written by Amrita Dhillon, Ronald Peeters
and Ays¸e Mu¨ge Yu¨ksel.
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chosen as part of an anonymous recruitment drive (e.g. online).2
We examine the intricacies of the gift exchange mechanism in the set-
ting of an employer who is seeking to recruit workers, or induce employees
to work harder. In particular we test how the ability to attribute voli-
tional choice in the oﬀer of a job to the worker can increase positive reci-
procity even in the absence of social networks connecting the referrer and
the worker. We show that the simple ability to be able to pinpoint who
is responsible for the oﬀer is suﬃcient to induce better behavior from the
worker.
We run a laboratory experiment where participants are randomly allot-
ted to the role of employer, referrer and worker. Employers can choose to
hire someone via anonymous hiring (a lottery) or to outsource the decision
on hiring to a referrer in the firm. The employer posts a price at which she
is willing to outsource the hiring decision to the referrer. Simultaneously,
the referrer posts a bid for the outsourcing. When the bid is higher than
the price, a successful outsourcing takes place at the price posted by the
employer. The wage to the potential workers is fixed throughout the exper-
iment. However, the worker only receives the wage if she is hired, whether
anonymously or through a referral. We vary the information available to
workers: some worker are uninformed, they do not know whether they
are randomly selected or whether they are selected through referrer choice.
Others are informed that they are selected by a referrer. Employer-worker-
referrer sets are matched randomly every round so there is no possibility of
repeated interaction. In the last 15 rounds the informed workers also get
information on the price paid by the referrer to the employer.
We present a novel motivation for the use of workplace referrals in
labor markets: the attribution of a favor backed by good intentions to the
referrer increases the chances that the worker will reciprocate positively for
the benefit of the firm. Since the employer hires a larger number of workers,
the causal attribution of an oﬀer of employment as a gift is less likely to
occur for an employer while if the choice of worker is outsourced to a referrer
in the firm, the perception of a volitional choice increases. We find that
2Charness (2004) shows that the mechanism wages are determined, either randomly
or by volitional choice, has an impact on the eﬀort levels chosen by the workers. We
investigate a similar eﬀect of the hiring mechanism on the workers’ eﬀort levels
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there is a diﬀerence of 4 percentage points in the returns of workers who
are able to causally attribute a specific person as being responsible for the
recruitment decision. Even if the wage oﬀered is the same, we find that the
worker reciprocates positively to the outsourcing. Egalitarian motives are
other incentives we investigate that support the higher eﬀort levels chosen
by the worker when she knows she is hired through referral.
The experimental design is very similar to our previous experiment de-
scribed in Chapter 4. We ask similar questions about the motivations of
employers, referrers and workers. However this time we are not investi-
gating the eﬀect of social ties but rather the ability to attribute the hiring
decision to one person. One addition of this experiment is that here we also
have the opportunity to test if the workers are influenced by the stakes for
the referrers. The price the referrer needs to pay to be able to outsource
the hiring is revealed to some workers in the second half of the experiment.
The last major diﬀerence is the personality test we asked participants to
fill in at the end of the experiment. This personality test enables us to
pinpoint the characteristics of those people who exert more eﬀort when
they know that hiring is outsourced to a referrer. This gives us suggestions
about what might be the motivation behind such behavior.
5.2 The experiment
We conducted our referral-recruitment experiment in a laboratory where
workers are in diﬀerent information states about the hiring process. We are
mainly interested in learning how and why these information states about
the hiring process shape workers’ returns and thus the decision to whether
outsource the hiring or not. The experimental design follows the model
closely.
Design
In our setting, there is an employer, a referrer and two workers. Decision
making takes place over two stages and how a fixed surplus of 30 units is
divided among the four agents will be determined.
In the first stage, the employer decides whether to hire a worker via
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the spot market or to outsource the hiring to the referrer. In case she tries
to outsource the hiring, she is asked to set the price to be paid to her by
the referrer in case of a successful outsourcing. Simultaneously, the referrer
needs to announce the maximum price she is willing to pay to accept the
task to hire a worker. In case the price charged by the employer does not
exceed the maximum price the referrer is willing to pay, there is a successful
outsourcing and the referrer is given the task of hiring for the price charged.
If the employer and referrer disagree on the price, the employer is sent to
the spot market.
In case the employer opts for hiring via the spot market or has failed
in her attempt to outsource the hiring task, in the second stage, one of the
two workers will be randomly assigned to her. Before learning whether they
are assigned the job or not, both workers have to indicate how much of the
30 units they return to the employer if they are assigned the job.3 At this
point workers do not even know that they are in the spot market, therefore
we call them both uninformed workers. In this case, the payment to the
employer equals the return of the worker that is randomly assigned the job
(minus 0.5 in case of a failure to outsource), the worker that is assigned the
job receives 30 units minus her return, the other worker and the referrer
both receive nothing.4
In case of a successful outsourcing, in the second stage, the referrer has
to hire one of the two workers. One of them is the informed worker who
knows that hiring is outsourced to a referrer; the other is the uninformed
worker who does not know if she is at spot market or if she is returning
to a referrer (see Appendix 2 for the choice screen). Workers are randomly
assigned to referrers and to the roles of informed or uninformed workers
every round. Simultaneously, both workers have to indicate how much of
the 30 units they return to the referrer if they are assigned the job. As the
referrer has no information on the returns of the workers, she cannot condi-
tion her choice among them on such information. The only distinguishing
characteristic of the worker from referrer’s viewpoint, is the informational
3This small change helps us to increase the number of observations without deviating
from the spirit of the model.
4The small penalty of 0.5 for the employer in case of a failure to outsource is introduced
to incentivize charging a reasonable price when trying to outsource.
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diﬀerence between the workers. In this case, the payment to the employer
equals the price, the payment to the referrer equals the return by the hired
worker minus the price to be paid to the employee, the hired worker receives
30 minus her return, and the other worker receives nothing.
Every round, each worker is assigned as an informed or an uninformed
worker. When a worker is assigned as an informed worker, she knows that
the hiring process is outsourced to a referrer. In addition, in the last 15
rounds of the experiment, the exact price at which the referrer and the
employer settled the deal is revealed to the informed worker before she
makes her decision on how much of the 30 units to return. Uninformed
workers do not know in any round if there is a deal between the employer
and the referrer, neither has she any price information. The setting is
common knowledge to the four agents. At the end of each session, only
the own payoﬀ relevant information is revealed to the participants; for
example, the employer never learns how much is returned to the referrer
by the workers.
Procedures
For each experimental session we created a session in Orsee (Greiner (2003))
and recruited among all students from our participant pool. In total we
ran six sessions. All sessions took place in June 2012 in the BEElab, the
experimental laboratory of Maastricht University. Instructions and com-
prehension questions were paper-based (see Appendix 2); the decision stage
was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher (2007)). Six sessions were run
with 24 participants, so in total 144 students participated.
Half of the participants in each session were assigned the role of workers,
one-fourth that of referrer, and the remaining one-fourth were given the
role of employers. These roles were kept fixed throughout the experimental
session. The participants interacted for 30 rounds, where every round anew
they were regrouped with three other participants, such that each group
consisted of one employer, one referrer and two workers. So, six groups
were randomly composed in each round.
In the first 15 rounds workers did not know about the price the referrer
will pay to the employer when a deal is made; in the second 15 rounds price
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information was given to the informed workers. After each round of play,
participants received feedback on decisions as long as they were payoﬀ-
relevant. This means that employers received information on whether a
deal was made (i.e., whether the bid was below the price) and knew the
return from the selected worker in case hiring occurred via the spot market,
referrers received information on whether a deal was made and in case a
deal was made, they learned the price and the return of the worker whom
they selected, and workers only learned whether they were selected or not.
Payments accumulated over all rounds and were handed out immediately
after the session. For each unit of payoﬀ in the experiment, participants
received 0.04 Euros. In addition, they received a show-up fee of 3 Euros,
and an initial endowment of 3 Euros in experimental currency units to
avoid any bankruptcy (for the referrers). Participants earned 14.94 Euros
on average.
After the experiment, participants were asked to complete a question-
naire. The first part of this questionnaire asks about age, sex and nation-
ality. The second part of the questionnaire is a self-report test (retrieved
from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute website) on the “Big Five” person-
ality dimensions based on Goldberg (1993). We used only those questions
that concern three personality traits that are relevant for our purposes.
Answers to the questions in the questionnaire were not subject to any
monetary incentives.
Hypotheses
In summary, our main claim is that job referrals as opposed to anony-
mous hiring works as a gift exchange and workers reciprocate being hired
by exerting higher levels of eﬀort. Additionally, we claim that egalitarian
motives are prevalent. In our experimental setting we test the following
hypotheses: (1) The employer, who does not have the choice to hire in-
formed workers, would prefer to outsource the decision to the referrer who
does have the choice of hiring informed workers (hiring directly) as she can
extract a price greater than the expected returns from the spot market.
(2) Informed workers exert more eﬀort than uninformed workers do at all
times. (3) When informed workers observe the price the referrer needs to
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pay to the employer, this should not lead to a change in behavior as the
referrer’s good intentions were already known. Reciprocal behavior of the
worker should not respond to the observed price, as the risk the referrer
takes increases with the price she agrees to pay but the gift given to the
worker does not. (4) If egalitarianism is a prevalent concern among the
workers then they should respond negatively (by decreasing returns) to
prices above 10, since this deal will sure disrupt a possible equal outcome
for all.
5.3 Results
In total 144 persons participated. Participants were undergraduate and
graduate students of Maastricht University from various studies, though
mainly students from the economics and business programmes participated.
With 53% of the participants being females, the sex ratio was quite bal-
anced. Of the 144 participants, 36 participants were assigned the role of
employer, 36 the role of referrer and 72 the role of a worker.
This section consists of three subsections. First we deal with the out-
sourcing decisions and deals between employers and referrers, where we
investigate if employers prefer the spot market or outsourcing the hiring
decision to a referrer, how often a deal is made and how bids and prices
change over time. Thereafter, we consider the hiring decisions referrers
make. We explore if a worker is more likely to be chosen by a referrer if
the referrer knows that this worker is aware of the returned units to flow
to the referrer. Finally, we investigate the amount workers return in the
two diﬀerent information states. An explanation of the workers behav-
ior, partly on basis of the personal traits elicited in the post-experimental
questionnaire, is relegated to the discussion.
Outsourcing by employers
Employers have to decide either to hire from the spot market directly or
to outsource the hiring to a referrer. If employers expect workers to return
more to the referrer, then they may opt for outsourcing to exploit this
diﬀerence. This comes only at a slight cost, because there is a small amount
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employer needs to pay if her oﬀer is declined. Despite this small cost in
case of a failure, employers still prefer to hire via the referrer rather than
via the spot market. Over 30 rounds, 36 employers made in total 1,080
hiring decisions, and in 786 of them (73%) a deal is oﬀered to a referrer.5
This preference to outsource is robust over time.6
In case the employer makes the attempt to outsource the hiring by
oﬀering a deal to the referrer, whether a deal is reached depends on the
referrer’s bid (which is her revealed maximum price that she is willing to pay
to take over the responsibility to hire). Out of 1,080 hiring decisions, 345
(32%) resulted in a deal between the employer and the referrer.7 Figure 5.1
shows the percentage of successful outsourcings with respect to all hiring
decisions for each session. Moving average of clusters of 10 rounds are
presented here to picture possible trends over time better.
Figure 5.1: Moving averages over clusters of 10 rounds of the percentage of
successful outsourcings per session.
The figure indicates that heterogeneity across sessions grows over time.
Before the first vertical line, the graph refers to the first fifteen rounds
5Percentages by which employers opted for outsourcing averaged by session are 66,
75, 73, 85, 68 and 70.
6Over the six consecutive bundles of five rounds the respective percentages by which
employers opted for outsourcing are 73, 79, 70, 71, 73 and 71.
7Notice that this ratio is less than the accepted deals in the previous chapter since
here the referrers does not have the incentive of possibly hiring a friend.
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where informed workers have no information about the price of the deal;
that is, workers do not know how much the referrer has to return to the
employer. After the second vertical line, it refers to the last fifteen rounds,
where informed workers possess information on the price that the referrer
has to transfer to the employer. Between the two lines, data from these
two informational variations are mixed.
Between first and second fifteen rounds, where workers do not know and
know about the price of the deal respectively, there is no significant diﬀer-
ence between gross percentage of deals (p = 0.1159; two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test on session averages).
Whether a deal is established depends on the prices and the bids. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows the prices and bids by rounds averaged over all six sessions.8
The average price is based on the instances where employers decide to out-
source the hiring; so, given that employers try to outsource in 73% of the
time, the average price in each round is based on 26 employer decisions on
average. As referrers do not know about the employers’ intention to out-
source at the moment of setting their bids, the average bid in each round is
based on all referrers’ decisions. We see that bids are declining over time,
but a bit slower in the second half of the session. Prices are decreasing
in the first half and settle down afterwards. As such, in the second half,
employer prices are not responsive to referrer bids.
Adjusting their bids to the returns they receive from the workers would
benefit the referrers. In case the returns are above the bid such an adjust-
ment increases the opportunity to make a profit, and in case the returns are
below it such an adjustment prevent potential losses. Figure 5.3 shows the
trend of referrers’ bids and the returns to the referrer. The graph suggests
that indeed referrers’ bids may be responding to the (relatively) low returns
of the workers.
Employers, on the other hand, are expected to adjust their prices to the
referrers bids and the spot market returns. Figure 5.4 shows the trend of
prices and returns from the spot market to the employer over 30 rounds.
Although employer prices seem to follow the decreasing trend in returns in
the first half, in the second half of the experiment employers discontinue
translating the further fall in returns into a further fall in their prices. In
8Graphs of the individual sessions do not look much diﬀerent.
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Figure 5.2: Average referrer bids and employer prices over time.
Figure 5.3: Average referrer bids and worker returns to referrers over time.
any case, employers keeping the prices far above spot market returns. This
leads us to think that employers do not choose to outsource in order to
share the surplus with the referrers, but mainly due to self-interest.9
9Note here that all employers in our data set have experienced at least one spot market
return in the first five rounds and 33 out of the 36 employers even experienced two or
more spot market returns throughout the first five rounds.
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Figure 5.4: Average employer prices and worker returns to employer via spot
market over time.
Hiring by referrer
When there is a successful outsourcing, a referrer is randomly matched
with two workers. One of them is an informed worker who knows that
the selection whom to hire is a deliberate decision by a referrer (who in
exchange pays a price to an employer). The other worker does not know if
a referrer is involved in the hiring process or if she is in a spot market; this
worker will be referred to as an uninformed worker. The referrer makes a
decision which of the two workers to hire.
In our experiment, referrers choose slightly more often the informed
worker. In the 345 decision instances, the 36 referrers choose 189 times for
the informed worker. Despite the fraction of such choices being just 55%,
this revealed preference for the informed worker is significant at p = 0.0277
(Wilcoxon sign rank test on session percentages). For each referrer we
calculate the ratio of instances in which the informed worker was chosen.
Of the 36 referrers, 21 hire an informed worker more often than an unin-
formed worker and 10 choose more often for the uninformed worker. As
there is no direct interaction between the referrers, we may consider the
calculated ratios as independent observations and find that they are sig-
nificantly diﬀerent from fifty percent (p = 0.0229). So, referrers are not
choosing randomly but deliberately choose informed workers more often.
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Finally, we explore eventual diﬀerences between referrers’ choices in
the first and second halves of the experiment. We find that the choice
ratios for the informed worker in the second half of the experiment are not
significantly diﬀerent to those in the first half of the experiment (p = 0.6735;
two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test on choice ratios by every individual
referrer). It can be claimed that the referrers are not anticipating a change
in any direction in worker returns from first to the second half.
Returns by workers
Figure 5.5 presents the cumulative distribution of the returns by informed
and uninformed workers. The figure shows that the returns by uninformed
workers are first-order stochastically dominated by those of the informed
workers.
Figure 5.5: Cumulative distribution of returns by informed and uninformed work-
ers.
Table 5.1 presents the average returns by the workers in the diﬀerent
information states during diﬀerent phases in the experiment.
Overall, informed workers return on average 7.73 (25.77% of the surplus)
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Worker 1–30 1–15 16–30
Informed 7.73 7.28 8.27
(7.60, 345) (7.08, 187) (8.16, 158)
Uninformed 6.55 6.85 6.25
(7.50, 1815) (7.43, 893) (7.57, 922)
Table 5.1: Average returns by workers in the diﬀerent information states over
diﬀerent clusters of rounds. Standard deviations and the number of observations
are presented in parentheses.
while uninformed workers return on average 6.55 (21.83%).10 The numbers
in the table indicate that during all prominent phases of the experiment the
returns of the informed workers dominate those of the uniformed workers.
To test for the significance of this finding, for each participant with the role
of a worker we calculate the average amount she returned when in each of
the two information states.11 On basis of the resulting 72 pairs of returns,
we find that workers return significantly more when they are sure that a
referrer is involved (p = 0.0005; two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank). This
eﬀect is also present when restricting to any of the other two phases as
captured in the table (p = 0.0089, p = 0.0013 resp.).
For informed workers, we find that revelation of the price referrers are
at stake for has no significant impact on their returns by comparing their
average returns in the first half to that in the second half by nonparametric
tests on individual level (p = 0.2618) or on session level (p = 0.4631). No
change is observed in the uninformed workers’ returns either by comparing
their average returns in both halves by nonparametric tests on individual
10To compare these returns to reciprocal behavior in related game settings: the average
return in trust games is usually about 37% of the investment, which would suggest a
return of 11.1 (Johnson and Mislin (2011)); the average return in dictator games is
about 28% of the endowment, which corresponds to a return of 8.49 (Engel (2011)).
However, in our experiment a worker is either sure the surplus is divided among three
agents or she is unsure whether it is divided among two or three agents. Therefore a
direct comparison of the results in our experiment to these related game settings have to
be digested with care.
11As workers do not directly interact (their payoﬀs are strategically independent) and
never get feedback on each others returns, their decisions can safely be treated as inde-
pendent.
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level (p = 0.6352) or on session level (p = 0.1159). We conclude that the
workers are not responsive to revelation of prices but it still needs to be
investigated if informed workers are sensitive to the revealed price itself.
Figure 5.6 shows the averages prices that informed workers observed
and their returns. We see that the average returns has a decreasing trend
during the first half (which is also seen in the table) and an increasing trend
during the second half coming closer to the average price. Due to the little
amount of variation in average prices (for every round the average price
of all sessions is between 9.00 and 10.34), it is not visible whether returns
respond to prices.
Figure 5.6: Average prices and informed worker returns over time.
To explore the responsiveness of returns to prices observed, we regress
the returns of informed workers on price and round. The result is presented
in the first column of Table 5.2, and reveals that there is no significant eﬀect
of prices on returns.
If informed workers are driven by egalitarian preferences, they may
respond diﬀerently to prices below 10 compared to prices above this level.12
The second column in the table presents the result of the same regression
when restricting attention to the observation where the price is 10 or higher.
12An explanation of this follows in the discussion section.
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All prices price≥ 10
Price −0.44 −1.21∗∗
(0.41) (0.45)
Round 0.14 0.19
(0.14) (0.18)
Constant 9.43∗ 17.38∗∗
(5.58) (7.12)
Observations 158 115
R-squared 0.02 0.07
Table 5.2: Returns by the informed workers. Robust standard errors (clustered
on individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
We see that for prices of 10 or higher, a further increase in price has even
a significant negative eﬀect on the return of the informed worker.
5.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this section we discuss the main findings and motives behind the behav-
iors of the participants. Firstly, we investigate why workers return anything
positive when they can keep everything to themselves. As we randomly re-
match employers, referrers and workers every round anew, and no identity
information is ever given, future interaction prospects and social proximity
eﬀects are negligible in our experiment. This leaves us with two motives
that deserve a deeper assessment: reciprocity and egalitarianism. We re-
peat the same definitions for those concepts from the previous chapter.
A reciprocal individual responds to actions she perceives to be kind in
a kind manner, and to actions she perceives to be hostile in a hostile man-
ner (Rabin (1993), Segal and Sobel (2007), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). When a
referrer hires a worker, this may be perceived by the informed worker as a
kind gesture as the referrer deliberately chooses one worker over the other
while risking a loss by placing a bid. An informed worker may want to re-
turn the favor. An uninformed worker, on the other hand, does not know if
she is chosen deliberately by a referrer who risks making a loss or randomly
through the spot market, therefore less reciprocal behavior should prevail
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in this information state.
When a worker can attribute the hiring to the volitional choice of a
referrer, she reciprocates, therefore we observe higher returns from informed
workers compared to uninformed workers. On the other hand, the worker
perceives to be hired as a gift but not so much the risk the referrer takes
to be able to do the hiring. The referrer might have higher stakes but this
does not change the size of the gift for the worker and we do not observe
any additional reciprocity when the stakes are higher.
Egalitarian preferences of workers is another possible explanation of
positive returns by workers. An egalitarian individual attempts to produce
equality even at a cost to herself (Dawes et al. (2007)). In the setting
implemented, a perfectly egalitarian informed worker is expected to return
20 since the surplus will be shared among the worker, the referrer and
the employer. The return from a perfectly egalitarian uninformed worker
depends on her beliefs about the likelihood she is hired through the spot
market or via a referrer. In any case a perfectly egalitarian uninformed
worker will return an amount between 15 and 20. Even if we do not observe
this perfectly egalitarian behavior, an informed worker is expected to return
more than an uninformed one, just to be relatively more equal.
The finding that for prices of 10 or more returns are decreasing in the
price can be convincingly explained on basis of egalitarianism. For prices
beyond 10, an equal division of the surplus is impossible; an extremely
egalitarian informed worker may punish the referrer for accepting a deal
that obstructs an egalitarian outcome.13
Egalitarian and reciprocal motives drives workers to exert higher eﬀorts
in the existence of a referrer. Therefore employers tend to outsource the
hiring often and the referrers mostly pick the worker who is aware of this
outsourcing process hence the volitional choice of who will be hired.
Finally, we regress the individual diﬀerences in returns between the
informed state and the uninformed state on the three personality traits
13An alternative argument is when the price is too high, it may not be perceived as a
gift any more. When a worker sees high prices, this means high expected returns from
the worker and may cause a pressure on her. It is as if the employer and the referrer
makes a very bad deal for the worker, or in other words it is the worker who has to pay
for the gift now. However this motive yet lacks empirical evidence.
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from the Big Five that we retrieved in a post-experimental questionnaire:
conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism. Due to diﬀerent motives
possibly aﬀecting participants’ behavior in diﬀerent manners across the
two diﬀerent informational variations in the first and second half of the
experiment, Table 5.3 presents the result for each half of the experiment
separately.
1–15 26–30
Conscientiousness −0.39∗∗ −0.36∗
(0.19) (0.18)
Agreeableness 0.17 0.35∗∗
(0.16) (0.17)
Neuroticism −0.18 −0.16
(0.16) (0.18)
Constant 10.76 4.94
(7.81) (8.69)
Observations 66 63
R-squared 0.08 0.013
Table 5.3: Diﬀerence in return between workers in the informed and uninformed
state. Robust standard errors (clustered on individual level) in parentheses. ∗∗∗p <
0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
We see that a high conscientiousness score is a good predictor of re-
turning more equally in the informed state and the uninformed while a
high score on agreeableness is a good predictor for a larger diﬀerence in re-
turns between these two information states, though only significantly in the
second half of the experiment. Neuroticism has an insignificant negative
eﬀect. These findings support our earlier explanations.
Firstly, Gerlitz (2008) claims that higher scores of conscientiousness can
be associated with weaker preferences for unequal distributions. If egali-
tarian preferences are one of the drivers for the gap in returns between
informed and uninformed workers, then we should observe a smaller dif-
ference for those individuals with weaker egalitarian preferences. After all,
informed workers are sure that the surplus is distributed among three indi-
viduals, while uninformed workers are unsure whether the surplus is going
to be divided among two or three individuals. Individuals with higher
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scores of conscientiousness, whom can be expected to have a stronger pref-
erence for unequal distribution, indeed have less diﬀerence in returns in the
two diﬀerent information states. This supports our claim that egalitarian
preferences have an impact on the return gap.
Secondly, Ashton et al. (1998) find that empathy/attachement relate
positively with agreeableness. People with high agreeableness scores would
empathize with the referrer about the price she needs to pay, but only when
they know that there is a referrer and more so when they know the price.
Hence the significant positive eﬀect of agreeableness in the second half of the
experiment seems consistent with our suggestion to explain the diﬀerence
in returns by informed and uninformed workers by goodwill towards the
referrer, hence the firm.
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Instructions
Welcome
You are about to participate in a session on interactive decision-making.
Thank you for agreeing to take part. The session should last 60 to 90 min-
utes.
You should have already turned oﬀ all mobile phones, smart phones, mp3
players and all such devices by now. If not, please do so immediately. These
devices must remain switched oﬀ throughout the session. Place them in
your bag or on the floor besides you. Do not have them in your pocket or
on the table in front of you.
The entire session, including all interaction between you and other partic-
ipants, will take place through the computer. You are not allowed to talk
or to communicate with other participants in any other way during the
session.
You are asked to abide by these rules throughout the session. Should you
fail to do so, we will have to exclude you from this (and future) session(s)
and you will not receive any compensation for this session.
We will start with a brief instruction period. Please read these instructions
carefully. They are identical for all participants in this session with whom
you will interact. If you have any questions about these instructions or at
any other time during the experiment, then please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will come to answer your question.
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Compensation for participation in this session
In addition to the 3 Euros participation fee, what you will earn from this
session will depend on your decisions, the decisions of others and chance.
In the instructions and all decision tasks that follow, payoﬀs are reported
in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). You will receive an initial endow-
ment of 75 ECU which will cover some loss that might occur during the
experiment. Just like a profit is automatically added to your total payoﬀ
at the end of a round, a loss will be automatically deducted. If at the end
of the experiment your total payoﬀ is negative we will ask you to donate
this amount to a charity organization of choice. This situation is not likely
to occur and under your control. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount you have earned will be converted into Euros using the following
conversion rate:
1 ECU = 0.04 Euros.
The payment takes place in cash at the end of the experiment. Your deci-
sions in the experiment will remain anonymous.
Instructions
In the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned one of three pos-
sible roles: employer, referee or worker. You will keep this role throughout
the entire session in which the decision situation explained below is re-
peated for 30 rounds.
Every round anew, new groups are formed consisting of one employer, one
referee and two workers. You will never be informed about identities of the
people you are interacting with: neither during nor after the experiment.
Employer
First the employer decides whether s/he wants to hire a random worker
from the spot market or to hire one via the referee.
When the employer chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market,
one of the workers is randomly assigned the job. This worker is given an
amount of 30 ECU and has to decide how many of this 30 ECU to return
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to the employer.
If the employer wants to hire via the referee, s/he has to ask a price between
0 and 30 ECU at which s/he is willing to outsource the hiring decision. In
case the price-oﬀer is accepted, the referee is given the task to hire a worker
and will collect the return, but has to pay the price to the employer. In
case the price-oﬀer is rejected, no deal is made and the employer will be
assigned a random worker from the spot market and collects the return
from this worker. However, in this case, the employer loses 0.5 ECU for
the delay.
Referee
The referee (whom does not know which way the employer likes to hire a
worker, nor the oﬀered price in case s/he wants to hire via the referee), is
asked to indicate the maximum price – the bid – at which s/he is willing to
accept the task to hire a worker. Afterwards s/he learns whether a price-
oﬀer has been made by the employer. The oﬀer results in a successful deal
in case the price asked does not exceed the bid.
In case no successful deal is made, the referee is not assigned the task and
does not have to make any further decision this round.
In case a successful deal is made, the referee has to choose to hire one of
two possible workers: Worker 1 or Worker 2. Once the deal is realized,
the referee observes his/her friendship-connection on Facebook to each of
the workers. In the first 15 rounds the information released is whether a
worker is a friend on Facebook or not; in the remaining 15 rounds the referee
also observes how many friends s/he has in common with the workers on
Facebook.1 The hired worker decides how much of the 30 ECU to return.
The referee chooses to hire one of the workers before s/he sees how much
they would return.
1Remark: Some Facebook-users use security options that do not allow us a perfect
counting. As a result, the actual number of common friend may be larger than the
number that is presented.
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Worker
In case a worker is randomly hired through the spot market (either because
the employer prefers so or because the employer has not been successful in
making a deal with the referee), both workers in the group are asked how
much of the 30 ECU they want to return in case they are hired.
In case a deal is realized between the employer and the referee, both workers
observe their friendship-connection on Facebook to the referee. In the first
15 rounds the information released is whether the referee is a friend on
Facebook or not; in the remaining 15 rounds each worker also observes
how many friends s/he has in common with the referee on Facebook (see
Footnote 1). Both workers are asked how much of the 30 ECU they want
to return in case they are hired.
The workers do not know each other’s Facebook-relationship to the referee.
Additional informational details
If the employer wants to hire via the referee, the employer only learns if a
deal is made or not. That is, s/he learns whether the bid of the referee is
below the price or not, but s/he will never learn the precise bid. In case of
a successful deal, the employer will not learn which worker is hired by the
referee and how much this worker has returned.
In case the worker is not hired via the referee, the return goes to the em-
ployer and the referee will not learn about the amount returned.
In case the worker is hired by the referee, the amount that s/he returns
goes to the referee, who in turn pays a price to the employer (and the price
is not known by this worker).
Notice that a worker decides how much to return before knowing whether
s/he is hired or not. At the end of the round the worker learns if s/he is
hired for the job.
Also notice that when the referee does the hiring, s/he does not see how
much each worker returns before s/he makes a choice between them. Sim-
ilarly the employer does not see any returns before s/he makes a decision
to go to the spot market or to hire via the referee.
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Earnings
Employer:
– If s/he chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market:
Earnings = return
– If s/he oﬀers the task to the referee and the oﬀer is accepted:
Earnings = price
– If s/he oﬀers the task to the referee and the oﬀer is rejected (and a
random worker from the spot market is assigned the job):
Earnings = return - 0.5
Referee:
– If the employer hires a worker from the spot market (either directly or
after an unsuccessful deal):
Earnings = 0
– If a deal is made with the employer:
Earnings = return - price
Worker:
– If the worker is hired for the job (either randomly selected from the spot
market, or chosen by the referee):
Earnings = 30 - return
– If the worker is not hired:
Earnings = 0
The earnings (in ECU) are accumulated over (all 30) rounds and transferred
to Euros at the end of the experiment (at the exchange rate given on the
first page).
Hypothetical examples for demonstration purposes
Example 1
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of 20
(price=20), while the referee indicates to be willing to pay a price of 15 at
maximum (bid=15). Then, no deal is realized between the employer and
the referee, and the employer will be hiring from the spot market. This
means that a randomly selected worker is assigned the job. Suppose this
worker returns 6 of the 30 ECU. Then the earnings of the employer are 5.5
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ECU, that of the referee 0 ECU and that of the worker 24 ECU.
Example 2
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the spot market directly, while the
referee indicates to accept all prices up to 7 (bid=7). The referee learns
that no oﬀer is made and that the employer is hiring from the spot market.
Like in the previous example, a randomly selected worker is assigned the
job. Suppose this worker returns 14 of the 30 ECU. Then the earnings of
the employer are 14 ECU, that of the referee 0 ECU and that of the worker
16 ECU.
Example 3
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of
12 (price=12), while the referee indicates to accept all prices up to 16
(bid=16). As the bid is not lower than the price, a deal is made between
the employer and the referee at a price of 12. As a result, the referee will be
hiring a worker and will collect the return. Suppose that Worker 1 and the
referee are friends on Facebook, this information will be revealed to both
of them now. Suppose that Worker 2 and the referee are not friends on
Facebook, this information will be revealed to both of them now. Suppose
that Worker 1 indicates to return 20 of the 30 ECU and Worker 2 indicates
to return 16 in case being hired. Suppose the referee (who cannot observe
the returns of the two workers) hires Worker 2. Then the earnings of the
employer are 12 ECU, that of the referee is 4 ECU and that of Worker 2 is
14 ECU; Worker 1 receives 0 ECU.
True or False?
After reading the instructions, before proceeding with the experiment you
should be able to tell if the following sentences are true or false. Please
write down your answers on this sheet. You will be approached by the
experimenter and the answers will be checked.
1. If I am a worker, when I return more I increase my chances of being
hired in that round.
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2. Every round I will keep the same role, but I will be rematched with
others to form a new group.
3. If I am a referee, when there is a deal I need to return the price to
the employer.
4. If I am an employer and a deal is made, I will receive the price from
the referee for sure.
Experiment screen
Figure A1.1: Information on social proximity given to subjects on the choice
screen
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Instructions
Welcome
You are about to participate in a session on interactive decision-making.
Thank you for agreeing to take part. The session should last 60 to 90 min-
utes.
You should have already turned oﬀ all mobile phones, smart phones, mp3
players and all such devices by now. If not, please do so immediately. These
devices must remain switched oﬀ throughout the session. Place them in
your bag or on the floor besides you. Do not have them in your pocket or
on the table in front of you.
The entire session, including all interaction between you and other par-
ticipants, will take place through the computer. You are not allowed to
talk or to communicate with other participants in any other way during
the session. You are asked to abide by these rules throughout the session.
Should you fail to do so, we will have to exclude you from this (and future)
session(s) and you will not receive any compensation for this session.
We will start with a brief instruction period. Please read these instructions
carefully. They are identical for all participants in this session with whom
you will interact. If you have any questions about these instructions or at
any other time during the experiment, then please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will come to answer your question.
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Compensation for participation in this session
In addition to the 3 Euros participation fee, what you will earn from this
session will depend on your decisions, the decisions of others and chance.
In the instructions and all decision tasks that follow, payoﬀs are reported
in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). You will receive an initial endow-
ment of 75 ECU which will cover some loss that might occur during the
experiment. Just like a profit is automatically added to your total payoﬀ
at the end of a round, a loss will be automatically deducted. If at the end
of the experiment your total payoﬀ is negative we will ask you to donate
this amount to a charity organization of choice. This situation is not likely
to occur and under your control. At the end of the experiment, the total
amount you have earned will be converted into Euros using the following
conversion rate:
1 ECU = 0.04 Euros.
The payment takes place in cash at the end of the experiment. Your deci-
sions in the experiment will remain anonymous.
Instructions
In the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned one
of three possible roles: employer, referee or worker. You will keep this
role throughout the entire session in which the decision situation explained
below is repeated for 30 rounds.
Every round anew, new groups are formed consisting of one employer, one
referee and two workers. You will never be informed about identities of the
people you are interacting with: neither during nor after the experiment.
Employer
First the employer decides whether s/he wants to hire a random worker
from the spot market or to hire one via the referee.
When the employer chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market,
one of the workers is randomly assigned the job. This worker is given an
amount of 30 ECU and has to decide how many of this 30 ECU to return
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to the employer.
If the employer wants to hire via the referee, s/he has to ask a price between
0 and 30 ECU at which s/he is willing to outsource the hiring decision. In
case the price-oﬀer is accepted, the referee is given the task to hire a worker
and will collect the return, but has to pay the price to the employer. In
case the price-oﬀer is rejected, no deal is made and the employer will be
assigned a random worker from the spot market and collects the return
from this worker. However, in this case, the employer loses 0.5 ECU for
the delay.
Referee
The referee (whom does not know which way the employer likes to hire a
worker, nor the oﬀered price in case s/he wants to hire via the referee), is
asked to indicate the maximum price – the bid – at which s/he is willing to
accept the task to hire a worker. Afterwards s/he learns whether a price-
oﬀer has been made by the employer. The oﬀer results in a successful deal
in case the price asked does not exceed the bid.
In case no successful deal is made, the referee is not assigned the task and
does not have to make any further decision this round.
In case a successful deal is made, the referee has to choose to hire one of
two possible workers: one who is informed that hiring is done via a referee
that paid a price to do the hiring (the price being unknown in the first 15
rounds and known in the remaining 15 rounds) or one who does not know
whether s/he is randomly hired through the spot market or is hired by the
referee. In either case, the hired worker decides how much of the 30 ECU
to return. The worker that is informed about being hired via the referee
knows that the return goes to the referee (whom in turn pays a price to the
employer); the worker that is unaware on how s/he got the job does not
know whether s/he returns to the employer or the referee.
The referee chooses to hire one of the workers before s/he sees how much
they would return.
111
Appendix 2
Worker
In case a worker is randomly hired through the spot market (either because
the employer prefers so or because the employer has not been successful in
making a deal with the referee), both workers in the group are asked how
much of the 30 ECU they want to return in case they are hired.
In case a deal is realized between the employer and the referee, one of the
workers is informed that if s/he is hired it is because the referee has chosen
her/him (the referee knows that only this worker is informed); the other
worker is not informed. Both workers are asked how much of the 30 ECU
they want to return in case they are hired.
Additional informational details
If the employer wants to hire via the referee, the employer only learns if a
deal is made or not. That is, s/he learns whether the bid of the referee is
below the price or not, but s/he will never learn the precise bid. In case of
a successful deal, the employer will not learn which worker is hired by the
referee and how much this worker has returned.
In case the worker is not hired via the referee, the return goes to the em-
ployer and the referee will not learn about the amount returned.
A worker who is informed about being hired by the referee if hired, knows
that the amount that s/he returns goes to the referee, who in turn pays
a price to the employer (and in the first 15 rounds the price is not known
by this worker; in the remaining 15 rounds it is). In case a worker is not
given this information, s/he does not know whether the return goes to the
employer or to the referee.
Notice that a worker decides how much to return before knowing whether
s/he is hired or not. At the end of the round the worker learns if s/he is
hired for the job.
Also notice that when the referee does the hiring, s/he does not see how
much each worker returns before s/he makes a choice between them. Sim-
ilarly the employer do not see any returns before s/he makes a decision to
go to the spot market or hire via referee.
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Earnings
Employer:
– If s/he chooses to hire a random worker from the spot market:
Earnings = return
– If s/he oﬀers the task to the referee and the oﬀer is accepted:
Earnings = price
– If s/he oﬀers the task to the referee and the oﬀer is rejected (and a
random worker from the spot market is assigned the job):
Earnings = return - 0.5
Referee:
– If the employer hires a worker from the spot market (either directly or
after an unsuccessful deal):
Earnings = 0
– If a deal is made with the employer:
Earnings = return - price
Worker:
– If the worker is hired for the job (either randomly selected from the spot
market, or chosen by the referee):
Earnings = 30 - return
– If the worker is not hired:
Earnings = 0
The earnings (in ECU) are accumulated over (all 30) rounds and transferred
to Euros at the end of the experiment (at the exchange rate given on the
first page).
Hypothetical examples for demonstration purposes
Example 1
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of 20
(price=20), while the referee indicates to be willing to pay a price of 15 at
maximum (bid=15). Then, no deal is realized between the employer and
the referee, and the employer will be hiring from the spot market. This
means that a randomly selected worker is assigned the job. This worker
does not know whether s/he is hired via the spot market (in which case the
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return goes to the employer) or via the referee (in which case the return
goes to the referee). Suppose this worker returns 6 of the 30 ECU. Then
the earnings of the employer are 5.5 ECU, that of the referee 0 ECU and
that of the worker 24 ECU.
Example 2
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the spot market directly, while the
referee indicates to accept all prices up to 7 (bid=7). The referee learns
that no oﬀer is made and that the employer is hiring from the spot market.
Like in the previous example, a randomly selected worker is assigned the
job who does not know whether s/he is hired via the spot market or via the
referee. Suppose this worker returns 14 of the 30 ECU. Then the earnings
of the employer are 14 ECU, that of the referee 0 ECU and that of the
worker 16 ECU.
Example 3
Suppose the employer wants to hire via the referee and asks a price of
12 (price=12), while the referee indicates to accept all prices up to 16
(bid=16). As the bid is not lower than the price, a deal is made between
the employer and the referee at a price of 12. As a result, the referee will
be hiring a worker and will collect the return. Suppose the referee hires
the worker that does not know a deal has been made between the employer
and the referee, and that this worker returns 20 of the 30 ECU, while the
worker who knows that a deal has been made between the employer and
the referee indicates to return 16 in case being hired. Then the earnings of
the employer are 12 ECU, that of the referee 8 ECU and that of the hired
worker 10 ECU; the worker that is not hired receives 0 ECU.
True or False?
After reading the instructions, before proceeding with the experiment you
should be able to tell if the following sentences are true or false. Please
write down your answers on this sheet. You will be approached by the
experimenter and the answers will be checked.
114
Appendix 2
1. If I am a worker, when I return more I increase my chances of being
hired in that round.
2. If I am a worker, when I return more I increase my chances of being
hired in the next rounds.
3. If I am a referee, when there is a deal I need to return the price to
the employer.
4. If I am an employer and a deal is made, I will receive the price from
the referee for sure.
Experiment screen
Figure A2.1: Information on social proximity given to subjects on the choice
screen
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In this chapter we discuss what we learn from this research, how it can be
applied and create value from knowledge for the society. Two distinct parts
of the thesis in diﬀerent fields of economics will be handled separately.
On political economy
Why in the Netherlands there are so many political parties where in the
US we only speak of Republicans and Democrats? Because the US has
a winner-takes-all approach in the elections and the Netherlands favors
a proportional representation. We know since decades that the former
approach leads to two major parties and the latter leads to the formation
of many political parties with diverse agendas. We just do not exactly know
why.
In our attempt to explain this observation, we challenge the assumptions
on how political ideology works. People are very much used to thinking of
political agendas as a piece of line with rightists at the right and leftists at
the left, which is the only way political agendas have ever been presented
to them. Coming back to our discussion in the introduction, a political
ideology cannot be observed directly but only in its consequences. We do
not have to stick to this piece of line, in the end it is only an assumption.
A model of political agendas as a piece of line tells you that there are
two types of extremes and that those two are furthest away from each other.
Here is what Clint Eastwood mentions about extreme political ideologies:
”Extremism is so easy. You’ve got your position, and that’s it. It doesn’t
take much thought. And when you go far enough to the right you meet the
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same idiots coming around from the left.” Oﬀensive it might be, however it
demonstrates the fact that we perceive two extremes not as exact opposites,
but as rather similar ones.
We claim that established views on political ideology so far might not be
accurate. We introduce a new circular model and explain the observations
above about the number of parties, with only standard assumptions. This
will help us for a better understanding of society, political dynamics and
outcomes of voting processes. It comes in two stages: firstly on an academic
level and afterwards on a societal level. In chapter 2, we develop a new
model that will be adopted by other scholars and lead to discoveries of
new insights on elections, party or coalition formation. This model has
also technical superiorities and we believe it will accelerate the research
progress in this area. In chapter 3 we provide necessary tools to work with
this circular model and explain why a certain equilibrium notion we create
is the most suitable one in this setting. Even if they do not immediately
adopt this new model, if we can get the academic audience question the
validity of their existing assumptions on political ideology this would be a
drastic contribution to the science.
Once the academic audience is convinced, it is very important that this
circular way of interpreting political ideology is publicized by media and
used in their electoral analyses. This will improve the accuracy of their pre-
dictions and provide the voting body a better understanding of the choices
they make. Policy analysts, media and non-governmental organizations can
beneficially utilize this new model. Elections are a useful tool for democ-
racy, yet elections alone do not constitute democracy. In so many ways
electoral design can restrict or even shape the outcome, some of these ef-
fects listed in the introduction. In Turkey, as an illustration, the electoral
rule was legislated by a military government after a coup in 1980 and today
still there is a 10 percent threshold of all the votes to have a seat in the
parliament. Introduced as a tool of suppression, this rule has also caused
a serious minority conflict for decades. Through this thesis we serve as
a reminder for nations that the design of the electoral rule is crucial and
every country should question if its electoral system fits to its changing
dynamics and investigate if the current electoral model fits the values of
the country and enables the public to be represented, rather than serving
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for the incumbent governments.
On behavioral economics
Lean Six Sigma, a renowned methodology that relies on team eﬀorts for con-
tinuous improvement, states underutilization of people and talent to be one
of the eight wastes that needs to be removed for a successful management.
Companies are looking for ways to create value by finding a good match
for their talent needs and provide incentives for people to work for them
by employer branding. Innovative solutions in talent acquisition and em-
ployee motivation are very much demanded by business owners, managers
and HR specialists and mostly provided by online services or professional
headhunting agencies.
With technological advancement and growing opportunities in social
media, hiring is not what it used to be. Providing behavioral resumes based
on big five personality test (JobFig), big data analysis for understanding
which strategies are more eﬀective for an employer for recruiting (Dice
- open web), active search engines for finding passive candidates online
(Talent bin by Monster), combining social media reports with applicant’s
resume is now the new reality of job markets.
Employee referrals, which means existing employees refer their connec-
tions for open positions in their company, however has been the choice
of employers for many years and it still is for one very simple reason: it
works. It has evolved hand in hand with social network revolution and to-
day there are Facebook applications that help employers identify potential
candidates among employees’ Facebook friends or tools to rate employees
on their referral performance (Jobvite).
Job referrals has some indisputable benefits. By homophily or assorta-
tive matching arguments, your employee networks provides an invaluable
pool for new hires. It functions as a screening mechanism and reduces
the uncertainty about a candidate’s talent or labor productivity. Through
better knowledge of both sides, employees can increase the quality of the
match between workplace and new employees. Referrals reduce search cost.
When it comes to blue collar jobs, those benefits seems to be much less
as these are manual jobs requiring comparatively less training, talent or
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creativity. For these kind of jobs employers are seeking for trustworthiness
and to avoid absenteeism and moral hazard such as putting in low levels of
eﬀort. This thesis demonstrates that job referrals also pays oﬀ when hiring
for blue collar jobs where talent is not particularly emphasized. The role of
job referrals is not limited to those of a disciplining and a monitoring device.
This work shows that social proximity, which is a natural component of job
referrals, encourages altruistic behavior between workers and help overcome
moral hazard issues.
This work also serves as a guide for designing a successful referral scheme
in companies for blue collar jobs. We list the most important elements that
needs to be taken into account in the scheme. Our points are simple and
eﬀective.
Social proximity is crucial. It is more eﬀective when employees invite
their siblings , cousins, close friends rather than acquaintances. This is an
important distinction from white collar jobs where the focus is on talent
and weak links when utilized eﬀectively is as important as strong links.
An advantage of social proximity is that thanks to high prevalence of social
networks, it is easily traceable. This thesis also presents that all the research
for linking social proximity information to social media sites are of great
importance.
The referral scheme itself should be clear to referrers and candidates.
The volitional choice of the referrer should be emphasized in order for
the employment opportunity to be perceived as a gift by the new hire.
The new hire will reciprocate to the gift by higher eﬀort and lower moral
hazard. High stakes for the referrer are not necessary, in fact it can be
detrimental for the process if stakes are too high. If the referrer receives a
lot of compensation, the new hire may doubt the incentives of the referrer
and might interpret the oﬀer as purely selfish. On the other hand if the
referrer has a high stake when the new hire underperforms, the new hire
might think that it is not much of a gift as she is placed in an uncomfortable
position.
In order to provide best fitting advice to companies on hiring strategies
we need to understand the mechanisms underlying the success of job re-
ferrals. Our work yields useful insights that are directly applicable to the
design of hiring schemes for blue collar jobs. Innovation in talent acquisition
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for white collar jobs while expanding in the direction of wider utilization
of social networks in hiring, can also benefit from our findings by gaining a
better understanding of the eﬀects of social ties on workplace behavior. The
concepts discussed here such as gift exchange mechanism, directed altruism
and egalitarian concerns are applicable to the hiring process for both types
of jobs.
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